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1.1 The need for long-term thinking in 
government and policymaking
Today, many of society's most pressing problems are 
long-term policy challenges, lasting a generation or 
more. Policymakers and business leaders often face 
strategic decisions with uncertain future outcomes. 
Yet, despite numerous unpredictable factors beyond 
their control, decision-makers need to be confident 
that they can achieve specific outcomes. Failing to 
do so could result in systemic failures with major 
consequences for society. 
The environment sector presents a good example 
of these challenges. Environmental policymaking 
is characterised by highly complex problems and 
uncertainty about long-term future developments. 
Problems often unfold over several decades, 
driven by a myriad of forces across multiple scales, 
resulting in complex interlinkages and feedback 
loops (Volkery and Ribeiro, 2009). And failure 
to manage such risks could lead to catastrophic 
impacts.
Over recent decades, academia and the public and 
private sectors have become increasingly interested 
in approaches and tools for long-term future 
analysis. The tools now available to make long-term 
decisions more robust include horizon-scanning 
approaches, model-based projections and 
comprehensive scenario-planning approaches  
(EEA, 2009; EFMN, 2009; Zurek and Henrichs, 2007). 
The European Foresight Monitoring Network 
(EFMN) and the Woodrow Wilson Center's 
'Foresight and governance' project confirm the 
vibrancy of the field, highlighting numerous case 
studies applying a diversity of methodological 
approaches. Public administrations and 
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international organisations have also established 
dedicated units or departments to focus on this 
work. 
However, while academic literature has 
thoroughly assessed the pros and cons of 
different methodological approaches, systematic 
analysis of their use, impacts and effectiveness in 
environmental policymaking is still superficial or 
absent. The role and relevance of political context 
and the institutional embedding of futures thinking 
in governmental practice has also received little 
attention (EEA, 2009).
EFMN (2009) sought to map the nature and extent 
of foresight (1) in Europe and other regions of 
the world, focusing on a review and quantitative 
analysis of a large number of foresight studies 
across all sectors. The study mapped and 
categorised them geographically, methodologically 
and in terms of content. While the extent and 
diversity of foresight work is impressive, much is 
taking place in technological, medical, agricultural 
and business-related fields, and the report does 
not seek to explore environmental foresight in any 
detail, nor the institutional and governance aspects 
specifically.
It is evident that the institutional and governance 
aspects of foresight work need to be given more 
attention. Making better decisions under conditions 
of deep uncertainty requires more than just rigorous 
analysis. Even well constructed, thoroughly 
analysed scenarios are of little use and relevance 
if the organisational capacity to absorb them is 
poor — if there is no political backing, or if relevant 
characteristics of the policymaking process have not 
been taken into account. Valid information can be 
useless because it is simply not needed.
(1) Foresight is often used as an all-embracing term to cover long-term futures studies, although it tends to be used to describe 
particularly government-led policy or research-oriented studies aiming at 'thinking, debating, and shaping the future' (CORDIS, 
2010).
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1.2 Obstacles to adopting a long-term 
perspective in environmental 
policymaking
Embedding a long-term policy perspective in 
environmental policymaking poses a number 
of challenges for institutional and governance 
arrangements. Two factors are particularly relevant:
• the problem structure: environmental problems 
are long term, complex and uncertain; 
• the problem-solving context: policymaking 
is often short term, compartmentalised and 
dominated by advocacy.
 
The characteristics of the problem-solving context 
make it very hard to introduce the long-term 
perspective needed to analyse environmental 
problems.
Problem structure
To understand how the future might unfold it is 
not enough to rely on extrapolations of past trends. 
Doing so assumes that current conditions will 
continue in the future and that the environment 
will respond as it has in the past. 
Technical models used to predict or forecast the 
future are also viewed with increasing scepticism 
because of the data and assumption employed and 
the opacity of the calculations undertaken. Often, 
the technical nature of models means that only 
experts can interpret their outputs. Non-technical 
policymakers struggle to use them. 
Alternative techniques for thinking about the 
future are therefore needed — particularly 
techniques that can engage policymakers in the 
process of thinking about the future. Scenario-
planning approaches can help deliver this 
alternative way of thinking.
The key challenge in generating robust projections 
of the future in this area is the complexity of the 
systems concerned. The environment's component 
parts are connected through innumerable 
interactions. Indeed, the more we analyse the 
environment the more we understand how 
complicated the science is. Interactions with social 
and environmental systems further compound this 
complexity, meaning that an enormous number of 
factors may influence an environmental issue — 
some of which humans can influence or regulate, 
others wholly outside human control. 
It is important to appreciate that an issue's 
complexity is unrelated to how much we know 
about it. Contrastingly, uncertainty relates to what is 
known and unknown. Uncertainties in science may 
be due to gaps in knowledge but may also be due to 
not knowing what you do not know (i.e. ignorance) 
(Gee, 2004). Further research may help fill gaps in 
knowledge but may also increase uncertainty by 
identifying yet further gaps in knowledge. 
The scope for uncertainty grows the further we look 
into the future. Uncertainties about the science when 
projected forwards into the future can be further 
exacerbated by uncertainties about future policy 
and policy responses, and about uncertainties about 
other external influencing factors (such as other 
environmental components, global politics, etc.). 
Climate change involves uncertainty because we 
do not know exactly what the effect of greenhouse 
gas emissions will be on global temperatures or 
exactly how feedback mechanisms will exacerbate 
or neutralise effects, or the level of emissions in the 
future. As we gather more data and develop better 
models so we also identify further areas that we do 
not yet fully understand.
Where there is 'ignorance' there is also the potential 
for vulnerability to 'surprises'. These include 
unexpected events that would have been difficult 
or impossible to predict given the combination of 
factors involved. 
Problem-solving context
The problem-solving context is the policymaking 
process. Policy processes vary according to 
circumstances but share certain characteristics:
There are strong incentives for policymakers to 
adopt a short-term perspective. This is in part 
because of the lack of hard, falsifiable data to 
underpin long-term policies. (The challenges here 
are apparent in the fact that all countries have 
struggled to implement the precautionary principle 
meaningfully.) But in addition to more concrete 
data for the short term, policymaking processes are 
dominated by electoral cycles (usually four or five 
years) and budgetary cycles (annual or periodic). 
Policymaking thus focuses on the short-term agenda, 
occasionally more medium term (5 to 10 years) but 
rarely long term (20 years or more). 
• Electoral cycles also imply changes of 
governments, meaning that the environment's 
prioritisation relative to other policy areas can 
vary. A government that sees the environment 
as a high priority may recognise the need for 
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longer-term policymaking in this area but may 
not be around to see its fruition, let alone its 
implementation. 
• Institutional path dependencies of 
administrations and policies are slow to change. 
Both complexity and uncertainty in the problem 
structure can result, in such circumstances, 
in institutional resilience to change and a 
failure to act. They may also result in a desire 
for more research to generate more evidence 
on which to base policy decisions. This may 
effectively postpone decisions rather than fill 
gaps in knowledge, and may militate against 
precautionary action. This may be the case 
particularly where there are strong competing 
external advocates for policy change in opposing 
directions. Of course, there may be very good 
reasons for requiring more information before 
taking action. The challenge is to strike the right 
balance. 
• Compartmentalism still often dominates 
government policymaking, reflecting the desire 
of government departments to defend their 
territory and budgets. Power may reside with 
the larger, stronger departments (e.g. in terms of 
spending power), and cross-cutting issues such 
as long-term environmental issues may suffer 
under the competitiveness of departments and 
ministerial ambitions, particularly in times of 
recession and cuts in public expenditure. 
• The dominance of short-term legislative cycles 
also means that policymakers in government 
departments are subject to external advocacy 
pressure by stakeholders and special interest 
groups who will be involved in lobbying for 
policy change, as they seek short-term gains and 
so reinforce the existing tendency towards short-
termism. Strong external factors can influence the 
politics and therefore the direction of policies. 
1.3 Current understanding of the use 
and impacts of scenarios
Increasingly, futures thinking and foresight is being 
used to inform policy, for example, through the use 
of techniques such as expert panels, workshops 
and scenario planning. Explorative  or normative 
scenarios are often used for long-term futures 
thinking whereas for more short-term purposes 
predictive techniques such as forecasts and outlooks 
are more usual. Figure 1.1 presents a typology of all 
of these forms. 
As noted above, the literature on scenario studies is 
extensive but far less has been written on how such 
studies are used or their effectiveness in influencing 
policymaking. Of course, many scenarios studies are 
academic exercises, not intended to influence policy 
directly. However, many are undertaken for policy 
purposes and their effectiveness in influencing 
policy is largely anecdotal. 
Figure 1.1  Typology of scenarios
Type of scenario Type of question scenario 
 seeks to answer
Predictive  What will happen…?
Forecasts …if the most likely development unfolds?
What-if …on the condition of some specified near-future event? (e.g. outlooks)
Explorative What can happen…?
External …to the development of external factors?
Strategic …if we act in a certain way?
Normative How can a specific target be reached?
Preserving …by adjustments to current situation?
Transforming …when the prevailing structure blocks necessary changes?
Scenario typology
Scenarios
Predictive
Forecasts What-if External Strategic Preserving Transforming
Explorative Normative
Source:  Börjeson et al., 2006.
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Other future techniques, such as foresight 
(large-scale, usually government-led, studies using 
multiple techniques including scenarios) and horizon 
scanning (the act of gathering new insights as well as 
identify new and emerging trends and developments 
which are on the margins of our current thinking, but 
which will impact on our lives in the future)  often 
involve  monitoring newly emerging trends and  
indicators.
The EEA report Looking back on looking forward 
(EEA, 2009) — a precursor to this study — reviewed 
the available evaluative scenario literature in the 
following areas:
• scenario typologies;
• assessments of what types of scenario work in 
different contexts;
• assessments of methods and institutional 
arrangements that enable organisations to use 
scenarios more effectively;
• reviews of impacts of long-term policy analysis on 
the decision-making process;
• analyses that evaluate the robustness of strategies 
over multiple scenarios.
 
The research found that only a few studies evaluated 
the actual impact of scenarios. Most of those studies 
found that scenarios were indeed useful in preparing 
corporate strategies and public policy, although 
most focused on the business sector. Moreover, the 
public sector presented several difficulties, including 
the varied set of goals and interests that public 
agencies face. The research concluded that more 
empirical evidence is needed particularly on what 
types of scenarios work in different contexts and the 
institutional arrangements that enable scenarios to be 
used more effectively, in order to demonstrate that 
scenarios can deliver on their promises.
An EEA workshop in 2008 with scenario practitioners 
from governments, international organisations and 
academics came to similar conclusions. It highlighted 
the fact that instances where scenario-planning 
and other future tools have been used successfully 
relate mainly to agenda setting within government. 
They seldom relate to actual processes of policy 
design and formulation (testing the robustness of 
different options under different, alternative future 
frameworks of action) (Volkery and Ribeiro, 2009).
Previous research for EEA (Sheate et al., 2007) found 
some evidence that findings from some forms of 
futures studies, particularly foresight, in areas such 
as energy and technology had filtered through to 
influencing research agendas, such as the European 
Commission's seventh framework programme 
(FP7), but this was less evident in sectors where 
foresight practice was less mature. The same research 
also found a paucity of studies into trends and 
megatrends in relation to research foresight work 
('…there is a distinct lack of research foresight that is 
megatrend-based', p. 37). Similarly, there were gaps 
in studies that incorporate unexpected events or 
'surprises' into futures thinking.
1.4 The challenge of using futures 
analysis in policymaking
Futures analysis serves several functions, requiring 
varied approaches and institutional arrangements 
Tools and techniques such as scenario planning, 
research and policy foresight, horizon scanning and 
analysis of trends and megatrends — collectively 
termed futures studies — can help understand 
issues of complexity, uncertainty and surprises. 
They facilitate thinking about the future and so help 
anticipate where surprises might come from, even 
though it may not be possible to predict them. 
However, such techniques can be seen either as 
highly technical (in the case of models) or highly 
subjective (in the case of qualitative scenario 
studies).  Both characteristics present challenges for 
policymakers seeking to undertake evidence-based 
policymaking.
Futures analysis can serve several distinct functions 
in relation to policy:
• agenda setting — identifying issues for policy 
attention and exploring uncertainties;
• policy development, including long-term 
(regulatory) impact assessment of policies;
• exploratory identification of long-term issues 
unconnected to policy development or agenda 
setting — 'blue skies' futures analysis, which 
may eventually lead to agenda setting or policy 
development.
 
The characteristics of the problem structure and 
problem-solving context outlined in Section 1.2 mean 
that there are significant challenges in implementing 
futures analysis to support policymaking. Many 
futures studies tend to focus on the agenda-setting 
purpose, implicitly or explicitly. This makes it 
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more difficult to integrate their findings into policy 
development, particularly when they are undertaken 
outside of government, for example in academia or 
private sector organisations. 
It will be necessary to employ different approaches 
and institutional arrangements to serve each of the 
functions in relation to policy listed above. And 
the extent to which futures analysis succeeds in 
performing each role is likely to depend on the nature 
and effectiveness of the institutional and governance 
arrangements. 
Even where futures analysis is part of policy 
development, its conclusions may not be immediately 
applicable. For example, an analysis could identify 
the need to consider radical options, whose adoption 
and implementation may be politically difficult or 
impossible.
Futures analysis is often unable to provide 
decision-makers with the certainty that they demand 
for 'evidence-based' policymaking
Futures analysis is positioned in the middle of the 
science-policy debate. This is because the problems 
addressed involve fundamental questions about the 
way scientific information is generated, validated and 
used. 
While policymakers increasingly recognise the 
need to consider the (long-term) future in policy, 
the trend for policymaking to be 'evidence-based', 
means that they often turn to 'science' for that 
evidence, particularly where issues are complex and 
uncertain (2). But futures work may not always be 
regarded as 'science' or 'evidence' in the traditional 
sense. It draws on a diversity of science, including 
qualitative and deliberative approaches, and is 
fundamentally interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary 
because the issues involve complexity and 
uncertainty. 
The notion of 'evidence-based' policymaking is also 
problematic in some respects (Coote et al., 2004). 
Multifaceted problems with multiple actors may 
have many 'optimal' solutions, depending on how 
the ideal outcome is defined. Scientific research can 
provide evidence but that evidence may support one 
perspective or many. The way in which such scientific 
research is framed will also influence the extent to 
which it resolves uncertainty or adds to it. Is the right 
question being asked in the first place? 
Science cannot supply the value judgements needed 
to determine what is a successful outcome; that is the 
role of politicians. Recognising that scientists may not 
be the most appropriate people to convey messages 
to policymakers, there may be a role for an 'honest 
broker' that can create bridges between science and 
policy (Pielke, 2007). Such brokers, such as advisory 
committees, may assist politicians in their assessment 
of alternative desired outcomes.
Policy is formed through a political process, which 
should, in theory at least, resolve conflicts and enable 
action. Political processes are often dominated by 
public debate rather than rigorous analysis or expert 
judgment (though the latter can inform political 
discussion) (Sarewitz, 2000). Science on the other 
hand is driven by theory and scientific method 
(whether natural or social science). These contrasting 
approaches can create areas of conflict.
• Scientists are often unable to provide politicians 
with clear, definite answers that cannot be 
challenged easily in public debate. For many 
scientists (particularly natural scientists) 
rationality and 'objectivity' are the stock in trade, 
while 'all science is, to differing degrees, uncertain' 
(Oldham and Willis, 2002), and there are a range 
of perspectives and opinions among scientists on 
any one subject. Scientists are unable therefore 
to give to policymakers the degree of desired 
certainty and, indeed, scientific advisers hesitate 
in view of complexity and uncertainty to give 
clear advice. Policymakers will seek to avoid 
offending a majority of voters and have to balance 
a number of different factors, often prioritising 
other decision-making parameters over scientific 
judgment.
• Not all scientists regard the analysis of future 
trends as 'scientific' as it is not based on hard 
data, or only trust the outcomes of modelling 
exercises where they can replicate the modelling 
structure. Consequently, many policy officers 
in ministries (many of whom have a scientific 
education) reject futures analysis as a basis for 
concrete policy recommendations, and many 
scientists think of futures analysis as non-scientific 
work. Policymakers may wait too long for 
evidence to justify action; or they may act too 
quickly and ignore information on negative 
side-effects. This suggests the need for analytical 
frameworks that can help address these 
dilemmas.
(2) Evidence-based policymaking is an approach that '…reviews existing research, commissions new research, consults relevant experts 
and/or uses internal and external consultants and considers a range of properly costed and appraised options' (Defra, 2005).
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• Science tends to operate on a different timescale 
from policymaking. This often reflects their 
different purposes, with policymaking frequently 
determined by particular political considerations, 
and electoral and budgetary cycles. Policymakers 
will often focus on the impacts of a decision 
on the results at the next election and are also 
subject to time and resource constraints. They are 
not necessarily ignorant of long-term challenges, 
just less willing to prioritise them. For politicians 
more used to 'evidenced-based policymaking' 
the 'evidence' coming from futures studies is 
likely to be seen as less 'robust', more qualitative 
(even subjective) and presenting potentially only 
uncomfortable choices. Politicians under the 
constant media spotlight are also under pressure 
to react to numerous individual events, leaving 
little time to focus on the 'big picture'.
 
Structured dialogue between scientists and 
policymakers can be valuable, for example in 
identifying priority issues for policymakers where 
science can help (Sutherland et al., 2006). It is highly 
desirable as an alternative to the traditional one-way 
flow of information from science to policy.
The use of futures techniques, such as scenarios 
and horizon scanning, provide mechanisms for 
thinking about difficult long-term problems, 
bringing to the table different perspectives and 
disciplines and different interpretations (see, 
for example, Sutherland et al., 2008; Sutherland 
and Woodroof, 2009). Such approaches provide 
a platform for exchanging knowledge among the 
actors and perspectives (Sheate and Partidario, 
2010) but do not provide definitive answers 
for decision-makers. Futures work offers thus 
opportunities and challenges to both policymakers 
and scientists. This may explain why embedding 
futures thinking effectively in policymaking 
presents such a challenge and has resulted in 
multiple approaches.
1.5 The BLOSSOM project: objective and 
approach
Project overview
In 2008, the European Environment Agency (EEA) 
started to analyse the success factors and barriers 
to a long-term perspective in public policymaking, 
with particular reference to environmental 
planning, in the BLOSSOM project (3). In a first 
phase running in 2008 (BLOSSOM 1.0) a review of 
the available literature and a consultation with key 
stakeholders came to the conclusion that scenario 
planning's potential to inform policy choices is often 
under-exploited.
A second phase running in 2009 (BLOSSOM 2.0) 
focused on the role and relevance of future's 
analysis, and practical experiences with adapting 
institutional arrangements to embed a long-
term perspective in government in EEA member 
countries. Country case studies were developed 
for a sample of eight EEA member countries, based 
on interviews with practitioners in government, 
administration and policy advisory bodies, and 
a review of relevant academic and non-academic 
literature (see Figure 1.2). 
In the third phase (BLOSSOM 3.0) during 2010, four 
additional case studies were included following the 
same approach.
Following the completion of the case studies (4), 
the present report analyses their key findings and 
presents a cross-country comparison. The main aims 
of this study are:
• to identify a 'toolbox' of approaches to 
institutionalising long-term futures thinking in 
government; 
• to identify which countries have introduced 
respective approaches and tools, in order to 
identify the pioneers and to see which methods 
have become commonplace and which have not; 
• to look for commonalities and differences and 
identify the factors that can explain the success 
or failure of efforts to embed a long-term 
perspective in policymaking.
Design and analysis of the country case studies
The BLOSSOM country case studies were developed 
following a common approach. Each started by 
identifying several important aspects:
• institutional and governance arrangements for 
futures work;
• institutional and governance arrangements for 
policymaking;
(3) BLOSSOM stands for 'Bridging long-term scenario and strategy analysis — organisation and methods'. Findings from the first phase 
of the project have been published in EEA (2009) and Volkery and Ribeiro (2009).
(4) The country case study findings are presented in Annexes 1–12 to the present report.
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• the nature of the issues addressed in futures 
studies;
• how the preceding arrangements interact.
 
Information on each aspect was gathered from 
existing documentation, where possible, and 
supplemented by interviews and discussions.
There were six main stages to the research:
1. an initial literature review on institutional and 
governance arrangements for futures thinking;
2. development of the analysis framework for case 
study research, for the country overall and for 
specific studies;
3. identification and selection of appropriate case 
study countries in discussion with the EEA;
4. individual case study research and analysis, 
including document analysis, semi-structured 
interviews with selected high-level officials in 
each country, and SWOT-tail analysis (5) 
5. writing up each case study country report;
6. comparative analysis of the countries studied and 
conclusions.
The research did not seek to evaluate the quality 
of individual futures studies or to explore the 
whole range of futures work (such as research 
or technology foresight). It only addressed those 
aspects of most relevance to environmental 
policymaking, notably the institutional and 
governance structures.
The case study countries were selected to provide 
a range of cultural, geographical, institutional and 
administrative approaches, including countries 
that were at very different stages of implementing 
futures thinking.
The interviews were conducted specifically with 
high-level officials, to ensure that within the limited 
resources available to the project sufficient emphasis 
was placed on understanding the real influence 
on policymaking and perceptions of how futures 
thinking was operating. Interviews included broadly 
similar questions tailored to specific circumstances, 
but covering:
Figure 1.2 Country case studies in BLOSSOM 
2.0 and BLOSSOM 3.0
(5) SWOT-tail analysis is a combination of both SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) and fishbone/Ishikawa 
diagrams, developed for the purpose of BLOSSOM. It begins with a SWOT analysis which is then aggregated into a two-sided 
fishbone diagram (see Box 1.1).
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Box 1.1  SWOT analysis and SWOT-tail 
diagrams
The SWOT (strength, weakness, opportunity, 
threat) analysis entailed the construction of a 
SWOT profile for each country case study, based 
on the findings of the country report. These were 
undertaken centrally, by the project lead team 
rather than by the country study authors, to 
ensure a degree of consistency in the approach 
used. They were, of course, reliant on the findings 
in the individual reports. 
Having constructed SWOT profiles for each 
country, the factors identified through the 
SWOT analysis were clustered schematically in 
'SWOT-tail' diagrams for each country. These 
diagrams were developed specifically for this 
purpose and combine the structure of the SWOT 
analysis with the visual presentation of an 
influence diagram — similar to a fishbone/fishtail 
(or Ishikawa) diagram. 
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• the interviewee's involvement in or relationship 
to the programme and responsibilities;
• the resources for the programme or specific 
study;
• the scope of the programme or study, both 
geographical and temporal;
• the nature and extent of engagement with 
stakeholders;
• the relative balance and influence of qualitative 
versus quantitative approaches or studies;
• the relationship between futures institutional 
and organisational structures and policymaking 
institutional and organisational structures;
• the nature of the sectoral or policy community 
concerned (i.e. sector-specific characteristics);
• expert opinion on success factors and barriers to 
success.
Appendix 1 provides the template protocol used as 
the basis for interviews.
In most cases, high-level officials were very 
supportive of the study and helpful. Interviews 
were sought from high-level officials involved in 
futures work and environmental policy. In some 
cases it proved difficult to arrange interviews with 
high-level policymakers. For most countries the 
number of interviewees had to be restricted to 
between two and four.
The approach sought to develop an overview of 
futures thinking in each government, followed by 
a close-up of the environmental policy sector. In 
some countries, however, futures work related to the 
environment appeared to be included under other 
sectors; in other cases, it proved difficult to obtain 
information on the environment sector and more 
information was provided on other sectors. For this 
reason, the studies turned out more heterogeneous 
than originally planned.
Following the production of individual country case 
study reports (6), SWOT analyses were undertaken 
for each country, providing the analysis framework 
for understanding — in each country — which 
factors facilitated knowledge exchange from futures 
studies or research into practical policymaking. 
These were then presented for each country as 
SWOT-tail diagrams (see Box 1.1 and Appendix 2).
Consultation on all draft case study country 
reports and the comparative analysis report was 
undertaken with case study interviewees in all the 
countries studied, and other stakeholders (where 
different) involved in the first-phase workshop 
(BLOSSOM 1.0). Their comments were incorporated 
into the final versions of the country studies and the 
present report.
(6) Country case study reports undertaken in BLOSSOM 2.0 were revisited and updated to ensure they were fully comparable with 
the case studies undertaken in BLOSSOM 3.0 for use in the comparative analysis. This report reflects that comparative analysis 
undertaken in 2010.
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2 Understanding the institutional and 
governance landscape of long-term 
futures thinking in government
2.1 Approaches for embedding futures 
thinking
At a general level, embedding futures thinking in 
policymaking can be approached in a number of 
different ways. The choice will be influenced by a 
range of factors, including the administrative culture 
of the country concerned, the timescale over which 
futures thinking has been developed in the country, 
the receptiveness of the policymaking process to 
futures thinking, and the reasons for undertaking 
futures thinking in the first place, for example 
particular triggers or events. 
Drawing on the cross-country analysis from the case 
studies, this chapter briefly sketches some of the 
key approaches for embedding futures thinking in 
environmental policymaking. Figure 2.1 summarises 
the main institutional, process and other regulatory 
mechanisms available for embedding futures 
thinking in government.
These approaches are briefly sketched out below 
to provide a proper understanding of their basic 
aspects. Examples are described in greater detail in 
the country case studies.
Figure 2.1 Key approaches to embedding futures thinking in government
Institutions
 Central body for futures 
thinking or diffuse across 
departments 
 Internal or external advisory 
bodies 
 Role of 
parliament/parliamentary bodies
Process
 Stakeholder or expert led 
futures work
 Use of specific futures 
techniques
 Thematic (cross -sectoral) 
or sectoral
Mechanisms
 Permanent or ad hoc 
arrangements
 Degree of independence of 
futures/foresight bodies
 Formal or informal 
reporting
Level of political 
support Governance culture
Key approaches to 
embedding futures 
thinking into 
government
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2.1.1 Institutions
Central body for futures thinking or diffuse across 
departments
Futures thinking for environmental policy may be 
driven by a central government body or agency, or it 
may be undertaken within individual departments. 
A central body can be located within or formally 
attached to the office of the head of government, 
or it can be within the remit of a discrete office or 
agency within a particular department. Equally it 
may be some combination of these.
The more that responsibilities are spread across 
different areas of government, the greater the 
likelihood for duplication of efforts if cross-cutting 
issues are tackled. However, a centralised approach 
increases the risk that futures thinking may be too 
distant from the information needs of individual 
government departments and result in a lack of 
ownership and acceptability. Moreover, the need 
to cooperate across departmental boundaries can 
stimulate interaction and policy learning.
In some cases, futures work might be carried out 
both in a central office and also in individual 
ministries and agencies. This may create its 
own tensions regarding ownership of particular 
studies, responsibility for taking the initiative or 
coordination of networks of futures thinking.
Internal or external advisory bodies
Advisory bodies are commonly founded to assist 
ministries and agencies, mainly by collecting and 
evaluating relevant information and producing 
analysis, either on request or independently. 
Advisory bodies differ from the centralised or 
diffuse approaches to futures thinking outlined 
above mainly through their organisational 
arrangements, i.e. they are attached to the 
organisational structure of a ministry but are not 
fully bound by instructions from the ministry. While 
internal advisory bodies are generally staffed with 
government officials, external advisory bodies are 
staffed with non-government staff, either fully 
academic or comprising a mix of academics and civil 
and corporate representatives.
Parliamentary bodies
There is clearly a role for parliament and 
parliamentarians (elected representatives) to 
have a role in futures thinking. Parliament itself 
can have a role in futures work, for example by 
requesting reports or studies from government 
on an ad hoc or periodic basis. Parliament and its 
committees can scrutinise government departments 
working in areas where futures are important, 
for example impact assessment of ministries and 
budget assessments. Foresight work undertaken by 
government may be reported to and scrutinised by 
parliament. Parliament may also be able to conduct 
its own studies, initiate relevant legislation around 
long-term futures issues and request debates. There 
may also be a role for parliamentary scrutiny of 
specific futures bodies within government and for 
science and technology parliamentary offices to 
provide information to parliamentarians.
2.1.2. Process
Stakeholder or expert-focused futures work
Futures work may be expert-led or involve 
stakeholders or the general public, or some 
combination of these alternatives. The nature and 
extent of stakeholder (and citizen) involvement 
in futures studies is likely to influence (or reflect) 
the nature of the futures techniques employed in a 
particular study. For example the more participative 
it is the more likely it is to draw on qualitative and 
deliberative techniques; the more expert-led the 
study is the more it may depend on quantitative 
modelling techniques. 
Many studies are combinations of these approaches, 
but the effectiveness of the techniques in embedding 
futures work in actual policymaking may depend 
more on the nature of the issue at hand. The degree 
to which futures work is stakeholder- or expert-led 
is also likely to influence the way in which the 
agenda for futures work is set, i.e. who has most 
power to influence the agenda. 
For stakeholder-led studies, a further question 
can relate to which stakeholders are involved. 
These may be different offices within government 
(an important element, as communication across 
the many government offices can prove difficult); 
a restricted group, for example representatives 
of the research community; or a much broader 
set of stakeholders from across various economic 
and social sectors. Where parliament has a strong 
role in futures studies this may also be linked to 
stakeholder and citizen engagement processes.
Use of specific futures techniques
Numerous futures techniques are available for 
very different, specific purposes. One principal 
distinction can be made between qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, with mixed qualitative/
Understanding the institutional and governance landscape
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quantitative approaches as hybrids in between. 
Another principal distinction is whether the aim is 
to develop fully-fledged scenarios or to scan various 
sources for information on emerging trends (horizon 
scanning), which do not require a formal scenario 
framework.
Formal modelling approaches can provide a better 
overview and understanding of causal relationships 
and facilitate an analysis of the influence of 
interlinkages between factors. However, they do not 
help with factors that do not fit into the modelling 
framework. Broader scenario approaches, on the 
other hand, can incorporate much more and varied 
information, but can fail to be coherent in their data 
and analysis or bring too much complexity into the 
analysis.
Normative approaches, for example involving 
a preferred vision of the future, usually involve 
backcasting techniques to identify the policy 
measures needed to achieve the vision. Strongly 
cross-sectoral studies, with potentially high levels of 
complexity, may lend themselves to techniques such 
as complex mapping (causal analysis) and scenarios.
Horizon scanning is a valuable and innovative 
technique, which may be used in a wide variety of 
ways. According to Defra (2010), horizon scanning 
'…is a distinct futures methodology that researches 
and draws out key trends which are on the margins 
of our current thinking, but which will impact on 
our lives in the future. These trends and drivers 
interact with each other and with the policies and 
strategies we put in place to create new conditions 
and new futures. By analysing trends and drivers, 
threats and opportunities to the department can 
be discovered and explored strategically. This will 
help to improve the evidence which underpins 
policymaking.'
Because horizon scanning often involves scanning 
non-traditional literature, for example newspapers, 
websites and blogs, it is possible that it may be 
met with some scepticism within ministries. 
Horizon scanning can operate effectively not just 
at the highest strategic levels but at all levels, for 
example scanning for relevant new technological 
developments within a sector.
Thematic or sectoral
Long-term environmental futures work may be 
undertaken within sectoral boundaries, for example 
in different ministries such as agriculture, energy 
and transport, as well as environmental departments 
and agencies. Alternatively, it can be undertaken 
thematically (cross-sectorally) either under the 
guidance of one or more departments or by a 
cross-departmental or central futures body. 
Centralised futures work may have a greater 
tendency towards thematic studies that cut across 
departmental boundaries, whereas departmental 
work may be more sector-specific. However, this 
generalisation may be less appropriate in relation 
to environmental futures work and policymaking, 
because so much environmental policy is by nature 
cross-sectoral. For example, climate change affects 
the environment, transport, energy, planning and 
industry departments. Environmental futures work 
might, therefore, be a motivator for establishing or 
improving cross-departmental futures work more 
generally.
2.1.3 Mechanisms
Permanent or ad hoc/on demand arrangements
Futures work may reside in a permanent futures 
or foresight body (centrally or diffuse across 
government departments) or in ad hoc arrangements 
in response to particular needs. It may be the case 
that ad hoc arrangements eventually give rise to 
more permanent institutions if they provide real 
benefit to policymaking. Ad hoc arrangements 
might allow for greater flexibility in responding 
to new issues, as expertise can be put together in a 
targeted manner. 
Permanent structures provide the opportunity 
for learning and capacity-building, developing 
a shared understanding and skills, and avoiding 
repeating errors, which can easily occur with ad 
hoc approaches. Moreover they allow for building 
up a reputation and thus increase the visibility 
and acceptability of analysis, although it may be 
possible for government to exert greater regulatory 
control over permanently mandated bodies. Within 
these permanent or ad hoc arrangements, networks, 
whether formal or informal, are likely to be 
important to bring actors in futures work together 
across government departments and from outside 
government.
Degree of independence of futures and foresight 
bodies
The independence of futures bodies will depend 
on a range of factors, not least the way that the 
body is resourced, for example with its own budget 
and regular staff. If established through legislation 
or regulation, they body may be more powerful 
because it is more difficult to abolish or constrain. 
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These factors will also determine the body's 
independence in setting its agenda. A cross-sectoral 
body that works across ministries within central 
government may have considerable independence 
in setting its priorities. In practice, however, it will 
need to establish good cooperation and ownership 
by sponsoring departments if its studies are to be 
effective and ultimately influence policymaking. 
Independence does not necessarily imply any 
greater degree of respect or influence for the studies 
undertaken, and may even militate against them 
being viewed as policy relevant. On the other hand 
an independent body may have more influence 
on senior government officials or ministers than a 
sectoral, less independent body that is considered to 
be territorially biased.
Formal or informal reporting
Reporting of futures work can be formal or informal. 
Often futures work undertaken within ministries 
or agencies will be for internal use and inform their 
own strategy or evidence base for policymaking. 
Major foresight studies may have a more formal 
function in reporting, for example to parliament or 
to government ministers, and to the wider public 
and stakeholders.
Reporting on futures thinking will tend to reflect 
its institutional and regulatory basis. Where 
futures thinking is part of the policy cycle (i.e. 
well embedded) it is likely to be a routine part of 
policy development, informing the evidence base, 
for example, through regular horizon-scanning 
reports, but with its internal focus less likely to 
be directed at the wider public. Major set-piece 
foresight studies, on the other hand, will tend 
to have a much more formal basis of reporting 
and follow-up (where it exists). They will often 
also involve a formal process of response by 
government, for example by the sponsoring 
department in the form of consultation documents 
on new policy initiatives. 
These studies are often underpinned by substantial 
scientific components, such as technical modelling. 
However, such large studies normally involve large 
numbers of actors and perspectives, and multiple 
interim and final reports and documents. As a 
result, they are not very responsive to events or 
changing circumstances. Consequently when such 
a study does report (e.g. after one or two years) the 
real impetus for the study may have changed, or 
the politics of the situation may be quite different. 
Shorter set-piece studies that have a simpler final 
formal reporting process may be more appropriate 
in some circumstances.
2.2 Factors that influence embedding
2.2.1 Level of political support
High-level political support — by ministers and 
senior officials — is important if futures work is 
to achieve its objectives, particularly in terms of 
influencing policymaking. Such high-level support 
may be provided by prominent references to the 
futures work in, for example, a coalition treaty, 
ministerial speeches, press releases or briefings, or 
assignment of personal responsibilities and approval 
processes.
The level of political support has many facets. 
Futures work may be 'institutionalised' through 
policy documents that call for its use and through 
broad awareness across government. Alternatively,  
sponsoring ministers may be formally obliged to 
approve foresight reports. Elsewhere, it may depend 
much more on the support of individual officials or 
politicians.
Political resonance may be achieved through good 
anticipation of information needs and the choice of 
the right information format, which in turn requires 
good insight and experience in governmental 
decision-making processes. Relevance may derive 
from exploiting an opportunity in a clever way. 
However, futures work that has been undertaken 
with a clear political focus but has not been 
explicitly requested can have uncomfortable political 
or financial implications. Another risk is that when 
ministers or officials change, high-level support for 
futures work is lost.
2.2.2 Governance culture
Cultural differences and legal and governance styles 
vary considerably across EU Member States (Perlitz 
and Seger, 2004; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 
2000; Hofstede, 1991). They influence significantly 
the management of political and public issues 
as well as the management within government 
bodies and therefore also play an important role in 
influencing the success of forward-looking studies 
and programmes.
One important aspect of a broader notion of 
governance culture is the extent of 'power distance'. 
Power distance is defined as the extent to which 
the less powerful members of institutions and 
organisations within a country expect and accept 
that power is distributed unequally (Perlitz and 
Seger, 2004). It also provides information about the 
dependence relationships in a country. A high score 
means that the 'power distance' is very significant, 
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a low score means that power is distributed more 
equally and is typical of more consensual societies 
such as the Netherlands and Sweden. 
Other relevant aspects of governance culture include 
the openness of administrations to approaches 
for analysing and acting upon uncertainties; the 
degree of individualism or collectivism; the degree 
of hierarchical or networked governance; and the 
extent of participative approaches to governance. 
A final factor is the universalism or particularism of 
administration and policymaking, i.e. whether they 
follow the rule of law and strict procedural rules or 
there is greater room for 'gentleman's' agreements 
and flexible cooperation driven by demand rather 
than by rules (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 
2000).
More hierarchical cultures may be more likely to 
have centrally arranged futures programmes that 
are more expert led. However, a more participatory 
culture may engage parliamentarians more in the 
process, which may also, by necessity, involve quite 
a centralised approach. The influence of governance 
culture on futures thinking may therefore be complex. 
While it has been studied extensively (especially 
in terms of corporate management), it remains a 
controversial topic in social sciences (McSweeney, 
2002). However, with increasing European integration 
and exchanges among governments regarding 
methods for futures work, these factors might become 
less important over time.
2.3 Reflections on approaches to 
futures thinking
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that a 
suite of institutional arrangements, processes and 
mechanisms can be put in place to help embed 
futures thinking in government and policymaking. 
These approaches will be influenced by the level of 
political support and the governance culture of the 
country concerned.
Many countries are likely to exhibit a combination 
of the approaches described above which at times 
are synergistic or antagonistic in promoting futures 
thinking in environmental policymaking. A mixture 
of factors needs to be considered. To establish 
effective futures thinking for environmental 
policymaking not only requires the right 
methodology or expert, but also the right approach, 
the right timing, the right context and the right 
political backing. 
There is unlikely to be one single measure that will 
enable futures thinking to be embedded successfully 
in governmental policymaking. Futures thinking 
takes time to become accepted and widely adopted 
— the development of the necessary skills and 
expertise is an evolutionary one and may not be 
optimal even in relatively mature systems.
The descriptions of approaches summarised above 
and in the country case studies in Chapter 3 raise 
some important issues. For example:
• If institutional structures are important to how 
futures thinking works in government, what is 
the effect of upheaval in institutional structures 
and decision-making processes on the skills and 
capacity for undertaking futures thinking? 
• Are certain types of structures more common or 
effective than others?
• Are there any patterns or correlations (not 
necessarily cause and effect) distinguishing 
different governance cultures and their respective 
tendency to undertake futures work, or the 
nature of the processes established (e.g. expert 
or stakeholder led, qualitative or quantitative 
approaches)?
• How coordinated or fragmented are the 
institutional and governance arrangements for 
futures work in practice?
 
Chapter 3 summarises the range of approaches 
applied in the country case studies and draws out 
key strengths and weaknesses. Full country case 
study reports can be found in Annexes 1–12 to the 
present report.
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Lessons from Member States
3.1 Introduction
The following sections provide a concise summary 
of each of the 12 country case studies examined 
in this research. For each country the summaries 
contain the following items.
1. Brief description of main institutional 
characteristics to reflect the broader context:
 (a)  formal horizontal coordination: the role 
and power of the head of government; 
single or multiple executive; the degree 
of intra-governmental autonomy 
of departments; parliamentary and 
semi-presidential/presidential types of 
democracy might be interesting;
 (b)  formal vertical separation of powers: 
centralised versus federal system of 
policymaking;
 (c)  executive–legislative relations: the degree to 
which parliament is involved and especially 
involved/specifically mandated to engage in 
forward-looking activities;
 (d)  electoral system and the party system 
— close parliamentary majorities and 
strong party competition versus legacy of 
cross-party consensus-building.
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2. Brief description of the main institutional 
settings/actors/mechanisms with reference to the 
key approaches/factors mentioned in the chapter:
 (a) main actors;
 (b)  institutional basis: informal or formal by 
legal obligation;
 (c) main mechanisms;
 (d) main processes.
3. Summary assessment of the maturity of the 
futures work and SWOT analysis/SWOT-tail 
diagram.
4. Good-practice examples and relevant follow-up 
information/links to the country report.
 
Each section therefore seeks to draw out only the 
most distinctive elements of each country's approach 
to futures thinking in relation to environmental 
policy. Alongside the text for each country is a 
SWOT-tail diagram, focusing on the most significant 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in 
relation to the futures processes in those countries. 
The more detailed analysis on which these 
summaries are based — individual country case 
study reports — can be found in the separate files  
Annexes 1 to 12.
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3.2 Austria
1. Institutional characteristics
(a)  Formal horizontal coordination: Austria is a federal 
republic based on a constitution from 1920 
(re-established in 1945). The federal president is 
elected by popular vote and appoints the federal 
chancellor, who is the head of government. The 
parliament has two chambers, the National 
Council and the Federal Council.
(b)  Formal vertical separation of powers: Austria 
has a federal level, nine regions (Länder) and 
local governments (including districts, cities 
and municipalities). The regions each have 
a parliament and a governor and they retain 
important powers in several fields, including 
planning, nature protection (as well as hunting 
and fishing) and farming. Moreover, the 
governor of each region has a duty to implement 
federal laws at regional level.
(c)  Executive–legislative relations: The lower chamber 
of the Austrian parliament, the National Council 
(Nationalrat), is directly elected by a mixed, 
proportional voting system. While the president 
is free to appoint the chancellor, the National 
Council can remove chancellors by a vote of 
no confidence and thus this post in effect must 
be supported by a majority in the Council. The 
upper chamber, the Federal Council, is made up 
of representatives of the regions. It has a weak 
power of veto that can be overridden by the 
Council.
(d)  Electoral and party system: No party has won an 
absolute majority in recent elections and party 
coalitions are necessary to form governments. 
While Austria was dominated for several 
decades after WWII by two main parties (on 
the centre-left and centre-right), they have been 
weakened in recent elections and now hold 
power together as part of a grand coalition. 
Austrian politics used to be described as 
corporatist — i.e. based on compromises among 
the elites, leading major parties and sectors of 
society — but this structure has broken down 
with the rise of new parties and demands. 
No information has been identified regarding a 
role of the parliament in terms of future-oriented 
studies.
2. Description of the main institutional settings/
actors/mechanisms
(a)  Main actors: The Austrian Environment 
Agency (AEA) plays a central role in terms 
of preparing forward-looking studies on the 
environment. Other government bodies also 
carry out future-oriented studies: for example, 
the AEA, together with the Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water, 
the Austrian Institute of Economic Research 
(WIFO), the Austrian Energy Agency and the 
Energy Economics Group worked together on a 
synthesis report on energy issues that included 
future scenarios. The Austrian government's first 
futures initiative, however, was a technology 
foresight programme carried out by the then 
Ministry of Science and Transport in the 1990s.
Scenarios on raw materials consumption
The development of Austria's 1994 National 
Environmental Plan reviewed the consumption of 
raw materials by the country's economy. Several 
scenarios were prepared to estimate future 
development of raw materials consumption and 
consider the effects of policy actions to stabilise or 
reduce consumption. 
Further information can be found in see the 
country report (Annex 1).
1994 1996–2008 2002
National Environment Plan introduced 
scenario use as a required policy 
instrument
Austrian foresight programme: 
'Delphi Austria'
Development of the Austrian Strategy 
for Sustainable Development
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(b)  Institutional basis: Austria's Strategy for 
Sustainable Development called for the use of 
forward-looking analysis in policy development, 
and as a result it is now common practice for the 
Austrian Environment Agency to prepare futures 
studies for the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry, Environment and Water as part of its 
review and revision of specific policy areas, such 
as waste management. In addition, government 
bodies as well as independent institutes 
collaborate on an ad-hoc basis, as in the case of 
the energy study cited above.
(c)  Main mechanisms: Futures studies related to the 
environment are embedded in the analytical 
work of the Austrian Environment Agency, and 
these studies are carried out as part of the regular 
policy process, as called for in the Sustainable 
Development Strategy. In energy as well, futures 
studies are closely linked to policy work.
(d)  Nature of processes: The futures work of the 
Austrian Environment Agency is mainly 
expert-led, and it appears that this is the 
case for studies carried out in other parts of 
the government. Many of the studies have a 
strong quantitative focus. Major strategies, 
such as the Sustainable Development Strategy 
and the Energy Strategy (both cited above), 
include participatory mechanisms such as 
working groups that bring together different 
government bodies as well as key stakeholders; 
however, the use of participatory approaches 
in the preparation of the futures studies that 
support these policies has not been found. The 
studies identified in general have a short- or 
medium-term time frame (e.g. to 2020), and few 
consider a longer period, such as 2050.
3. Summary assessment
The Austrian federal government uses 
futures studies on a regular basis as analytical 
background for the preparation and the revision of 
environmental policies. As a result, forward-looking 
thinking has become a regular part of the policy 
process. The Austrian Environment Agency prepares 
many of these studies and has built its institutional 
capacity in this area. Federal government bodies 
have also worked together on futures studies, 
notably in the area of energy. In this and other areas 
— notably technology foresight — futures studies 
have influenced policymaking. The analysis has 
not, however, identified more exploratory studies 
carried out in Austria. Moreover, most of the studies 
identified focus on quantitative methods.
Austria SWOT-tail diagram
Well integrated 
methods / approach
STRENGTHS
OPPORTUNITIES THREATS
High levels of 
expertise
Established 
networking between 
organisations
WEAKNESSES
Environment 
falling on political 
and public agenda
Work on future studies in 
different environmental 
policy areas can be 
integrated
Political commitment to 
the use of future studies
Clearly defined 
responsibilities
Lack of more 
visionary 
approaches in 
futures thinking”Knowledge brokerage 
for embedding long 
term futures studies 
into policy
Futures 
research
Environmental
policy
Reviewing role of future 
studies in policy can 
strengthen the system
Strong use of 
quantitative 
modelling
Lessons from Member States
BLOSSOM — A cross-country analysis 23
3.3 Finland
1. Institutional characteristics
(a)  Formal horizontal coordination: Finland enacted 
a new constitution in 2000 which shifted the 
country towards a more parliamentary system 
and curtailed presidential powers. Government 
power relative to the opposition has grown, and 
individual ministries within government have 
assumed greater decision-making powers at the 
expense of government-level decision-making. 
This has not reduced the collegial working 
method of the cabinet, which is necessary to 
maintain a multiparty government. Government 
foresight reporting resides within the Prime 
Minister's Office.
(b)  Formal vertical separation of powers: Finland is quite 
decentralised, divided into six administrative 
provinces which function as divisions of state 
organisation. State services operate under their 
administration, and there is a degree of regional 
autonomy in allocating funds and shaping policy. 
Finnish administrative/governance culture is 
quite informal and generally highly participative.
(c)  Executive–legislative relations: In 1992 an initiative 
by parliament called on the government to 
prepare and present strategies for Finland's 
future. Once per electoral period, the 
Government Foresight Report Task Force 
produces a foresight report on long-term 
future prospects and the government's targets, 
which should be submitted to parliament by 
the end of the second year of government. The 
subject of the report is selected by the prime 
minister in consultation with cabinet members. 
The Committee for the Future, appointed by 
parliament, prepares a statement in response to 
the report. Reporting to parliament facilitates a 
dialogue between government and parliament on 
national futures issues.
(d)  The electoral system: Since the introduction of 
proportional representation in 1906, Finland has 
used the d'Hondt constituency list system with 
only slight modifications. Under this system, 
elections are based on proportionality, and seats 
are allotted to parties commensurately with the 
number of votes polled. The presidential election 
occurs every six years in the month of January.
2. Institutional settings/actors/mechanisms
(a)  Main actors: The Government Foresight Report 
Task Force and Steering Group are located 
in the Prime Minister's Office and lead on 
Government Foresight Reports. The Committee 
for the Future contributes to the Government 
Foresight Report, providing cross-government 
input into the studies, ensuring the outcomes of 
the work are communicated to regional actors 
and providing a mechanism by which feedback 
from regional stakeholders is incorporated into 
the committee's response to the government. The 
Government Foresight Report is also informed by 
research institutes, experts (often from academia 
and industry) and government ministries. The 
Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE) is the 
national research and development institute 
within the environmental administration of 
Finland, the Ministry of the Environment, 
which also undertakes its own futures studies. 
All ministries produce medium-term strategies 
(for 10 to 15 years).
Long-term climate and energy policy: 
Towards a low-carbon Finland (2009)
Towards a low-carbon Finland (2009) aims to 
help build the consensus required to shift Finland 
to a low-carbon society. It reviews the long-term 
challenges of climate and energy policy from 
global and national perspectives, and outlines 
targets and measures marking out the road to a 
thriving and low-carbon Finland. The time horizon 
of the report extends until the mid-century 
and beyond as necessary, covering measures 
both to mitigate climate change and to adapt 
to its impacts. Besides energy production, the 
report discusses energy consumption, transport, 
forests and other themes central to climate 
protection. The preparation of the report included 
commissioning a number of studies on climate 
and energy policy issues as background material. 
Stakeholder panels and online discussions 
provided feedback. The background scenarios 
included in the report are also based on a 
participatory approach.
In the report the government sets its target to 
actively contribute towards limiting the rise in the 
global average temperature to 2 degrees Celsius 
at most. 
Further information can be found in the country 
report (Annex 2) and at http://www.government.
fi/toiminta/tulevaisuusselonteko/en.jsp. 
1993 2000
Parliament calls on the government to prepare and 
present strategies for Finland's future
The Committee for the Future is granted permanent 
status in 2000
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(b)  Institutional basis: The institutional basis for 
government futures work is formal, as it is a 
requirement by parliament for government to 
report once per electoral period.
(c)  Main mechanisms: The Government Foresight 
Network is an inter-ministerial forum for 
cooperation and exchange of futures thinking 
in governmental ministries. It contributes to 
the strategic planning and direction for the 
administrative sector as well as the government's 
decision-making. The network is a forum for 
discussing the results of futures work carried out 
in ministries, connecting specialists in each of 
the ministries. In addition, the network seeks to 
develop ministries' foresight processes, promote 
foresight activities at the regional level and 
ensure that the outcomes of foresight processes 
are put to use in policymaking. The network's 
team, composed of members from all ministries, 
is appointed by the Prime Minister's Office and 
lasts the length of the government's term of 
office. The Committee for the Future was made 
permanent in 2000.
(d)  Nature of processes: Major foresight studies 
involve extensive participation of stakeholders, 
including through the Committee for the Future 
undertaking regional consultations. Studies 
use a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches, though the shorter medium-term 
time frame for ministerial strategies tends to 
mean a more quantitative approach and a degree 
of scepticism about qualitative scenarios.
3. Summary assessment
The Committee for the Future, and the Government 
Foresight Report, are key success factors in 
the successful uptake of futures thinking into 
(environmental) policymaking. Members of 
government have also in the past served on this 
committee. The issues raised by the Government 
Foresight Report are bigger than the government of 
the day, and the temporal scale they cover demands 
a response that will necessarily span over the term 
of more than a single government. The Government 
Foresight Reports are used to engage stakeholders 
at regional level and to set the context for strategic 
policymaking across the ministries, making explicit 
links to the operational side of policymaking 
through ministerial strategies. Although this time 
frame does not always fit well with the longer-term 
perspective of futures studies, it does provide a 
mechanism by which futures can be incorporated 
into policymaking. One potential downside of the 
once per electoral cycle reporting requirement across 
government is that it is quite inflexible and less 
able to address new issues as they arise, which in 
turn could reduce the relevance of such studies to 
government strategic priorities.
Finland SWOT-tail diagram
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3.4 France
1. Institutional characteristics
(a)  Formal horizontal coordination: The French political 
system is based on the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic of 1958, which gives strong powers 
to the president, who since 1962 is elected by 
direct universal suffrage. The president names 
the prime minister and these two positions 
share executive power. Parliament overall has a 
limited role. The prime minister is the head of 
government and has a coordinating role but does 
not have hierarchical power on other ministers. 
As a result, each ministry is quite independent.
(b)  Formal vertical separation of powers: France is 
a centralised unitary state and the national 
administration with a strong central government 
has offices at regional and department 
level. Since the beginning of the 1980s, a 
decentralisation process has given greater power 
to the regions, departments and communes 
(local governments), the three territorial units in 
France.
(c)  Executive–legislative relations: The French 
parliament is bicameral and divided into two 
chambers, the National Assembly and the 
French Senate. In October 2009, the French 
Senate established a Delegation on Future 
Perspectives (7); moreover, the Senate now 
considers foresight as its third mission, together 
with law-making and with oversight of 
government activities.
(d)  Electoral and party system: France has a two-stage 
electoral system which has led to two major 
right and left party coalitions that have 
dominated politics since the beginning of the 
Fifth Republic. France is not characterised by 
cross-party consensus-building but rather by 
strong divergences between left and right. Such 
features of the French political landscape should 
not facilitate the embedding of a longer-term 
perspective in French policymaking.
2.  Institutional settings/actors/mechanisms
(a)  Main actors: Two main governmental institutions 
are promoting and carrying out environmental 
foresight studies in the French government, 
the Foresight Studies Mission (FSM) (8) within 
the Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable 
Development and of the Sea (MEESDS) (9) 
and the Centre of Strategic Analysis (CSA) (10) 
affiliated to the prime minister under the 
State Secretary of Foresight Studies and of the 
Development of E-economy (11). A Delegation 
on Future Perspectives was established in 
October 2009 by the French Senate (see above). 
The two main government bodies working on 
environmental foresight studies, the CSA and the 
FSM, cooperate but do not have a hierarchical 
relationship. A government coordination 
mechanism has been established for future 
programmes: an informal inter-ministerial 
committee that meets once a month.
(7) La Délégation à la Prospective.
(8) La mission prospective.
(9) Le ministère de l'Ecologie, de l'Energie, du Développement durable et de la Mer.
(10) Centre d'analyse stratégique.
(11) Secrétaire d'Etat chargée de la prospective et du développement de l'économie numérique.
France 2025
France 2025 is a strategic assessment project 
launched by the CSA. It aims at identifying 
possible future development scenarios for the 
country and to recommend winning strategies. It 
was requested by the prime minister in 2008. 
Eight different groups participated in the 
production of France 2025. The group on scarce 
resources and environment, led by the CSA, 
focused on the following issues:
• energy and climate change;
• raw mineral material economics; 
• French agriculture (how to produce and respect 
the environment);
• biodiversity threatened by economic 
development.
 
Further information can be found in the country 
report (Annex 3). The reports produced by France 
2025 are available on the website of the CSA: 
http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/rubrique.php3?id_
rubrique=239.
It is too early to assess how France 2025 has 
influenced policy decisions. 
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(b)  Institutional basis: The government and the 
French Senate are not legally bound to develop 
environmental foresight study activities. The 
CSA, the FSM and the Delegation on Future 
Perspectives were set up to meet a policy 
decision to provide long-term perspective in 
policymaking.
(c)  Main mechanisms: The CSA and the FSM and the 
Delegation on Future Perspective are permanent 
institutions and were not set up for a specific 
project or programme. With the establishment 
of the CSA and FSM, environmental foresight 
studies have been more closely integrated 
into the French decision-making process: 
these two institutions are closely linked to 
decision-makers (12) and they support and advise 
them in their sustainable development and 
environmental choices. This close relationship 
can be considered as a success factor, but there 
is a concern that foresight studies may become 
technocratic tools in support of the decision-
making process, limiting more exploratory 
studies. Despite a long history of foresight in 
France, the institutional set-up in government is 
relatively new, as is the Senate's Delegation, and 
it is too early to assess the results.
(d)  Nature of processes: Despite a strong technocratic 
tradition in France, foresight studies led by the 
CSA and FSM are increasingly developed with 
the participation of stakeholders (the government 
follows a 'rule of five' for stakeholders: the State, 
local authorities, NGOs, employer organisations 
and labour unions).
3.  Summary assessment
The French government now sees future-oriented 
studies as an important input to policymaking. 
It has set up a large ministry responsible for 
environment, energy and sustainable development 
with a strong role for futures studies to inform 
policymaking. A foresight study institution with 
a sustainable development department has been 
established under the authority of the prime 
minister. Such changes show that environmental 
foresight studies are increasingly integrated into the 
French decision-making process. Foresight studies 
are elaborated with the consultation of the relevant 
stakeholders and a new communication strategy 
to disseminate the findings of futures work is well 
established and regarded as effective. This new role 
could, however, limit the development of long-term 
exploratory studies. While the French government 
has a fairly long tradition of futures studies, only 
recently have they been brought in as an important 
component of the policy process, and it is not yet 
possible to assess how effective this new role will be.
(12) The FSM is part of the General Commissariat of Sustainable Development in charge of the strategic choices of the MEESDS on 
priorities and cross-cutting issues relating to sustainable development. The CSA is an advisory body under direct responsibility of 
the prime minister.
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3.5 Germany
1. Institutional characteristics
(a) Formal horizontal coordination: Germany is a 
federal republic in which the federal parliament 
holds a central role. The federal chancellor is 
elected by the parliament AND determines the 
political guidelines; he or she is supported by 
the cabinet of ministers. The federal government 
and the ministries are advised by agencies, 
independent councils and other bodies, including 
in the areas of environment and sustainable 
development.
(b) Formal vertical separation of powers: Germany 
has a federal structure: it is divided into the 
federal, regional (Bundesländer) and local levels. 
Germany's Basic Law sets the division of powers 
and confers extensive rights to the Bundesländer 
and the municipalities for self-government. 
The Bundesländer have their own parliaments 
and executive bodies. The Bundesländer also 
participate in the federal law-making process 
through the Bundesrat, a body of their 
representatives, which has rights to assent or veto 
legislation.
(c) Executive–legislative relations: The parliament must 
adopt all important decisions, and important 
political strategies approved by the federal 
government must also go to the parliament. 
The parliament has played only a small role in 
futures studies, though in 2004 it established an 
Advisory Council on Sustainability to monitor 
the implementation of the national and European 
Sustainable Development Strategy; from the 
beginning of 2010 this council reviews proposed 
laws on their compatibility with the national 
Sustainable Development Strategy.
(d) The electoral system at the federal and regional 
level uses proportional representation. National 
and Landër governments are typically coalitions 
as one party rarely holds an absolute majority. 
The current coalition government at federal level 
is made up of the Christian Democrat and Liberal 
Democrat parties. 
2. Institutional settings/actors/mechanisms
(a) Main actors: No central body exists for 
forward-looking studies at the federal level, 
either as a whole or for studies on environment. 
Instead a range of federal bodies have 
undertaken or commissioned forward-looking 
studies, including the Federal Environment 
Agency (UBA), the Advisory Council on the 
Environment (SRU) and the Advisory Council 
on Global Change (WBGU). A range of private 
institutes also undertake futures work, which 
Energy scenarios for an energy concept of 
the federal government
The coalition agreement for the government 
that took power in 2009 included the elaboration 
of a new energy concept on the basis of 
'scenario-related guidelines for a clean, reliable 
and affordable energy supply'. This concept was 
adopted on 28 September 2010.
The federal government commissioned a 
consortium of research institutes to elaborate a 
study on 'energy scenarios for an energy concept 
of the federal government'. The scenarios were 
based on assumptions that were developed in 
consultation with the Ministry of Economy and 
Technology and the Ministry of the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. After its 
publication the study was extensively discussed in 
political circles and the adopted Energy Concept 
explicitly identifies the study as its scientific basis.
The study develops one reference and eight target 
scenarios that project different developments of 
the energy sector taking into account a time span 
until 2050.
In addition to this study, the new German Energy 
Concept draws on a series of other studies in the 
fields of climate change and energy.
Further information can be found in the country 
report (Annex 4).
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is also carried out in some of the Bundesländer. 
The Federal Chancellery supported by the 
Committee of State Secretaries and the Council 
for Sustainable Development is responsible for 
the implementation and update of the national 
Sustainable Development Strategy, a process that 
supports forward-looking thinking. The Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) 
has a long tradition of forward-looking work, 
including the foresight process launched in 2007.
(b) Institutional basis: Germany does not have formal 
legal or policy requirements for forward-looking 
work, which is carried out on an ad-hoc basis.
(c) Main mechanisms: Future-oriented studies 
are carried out and commissioned by federal 
ministries, agencies and councils. While the 
Federal Environment Agency has a division 
whose work includes sustainable strategies and 
scenarios, in general the government does not 
have structures specifically for this work. Some 
of these studies are carried out in the context of 
policy decisions. The foresight work carried out 
by the Ministry of Education and Research serves 
as a tool to provide input to the process for 
setting research policy and agendas. A number 
of government bodies have prepared studies in 
the process to develop a new Energy Concept 
(approved by the cabinet in September 2010).
(d) Nature of processes: Forward-looking studies in 
Germany have a strong expert-led component: 
many use a quantitative approach and have 
limited stakeholder involvement. Within the 
UBA, a change has been seen towards the use 
of more qualitative approaches and broader 
consultation. The process to update Germany's 
Sustainable Development Strategy has used 
new tools, including external peer reviews 
and online forums for interested citizens. The 
BMBF's new foresight process also uses a range 
of participative tools, including online forums, 
workshops, conferences and the consultation of 
expert teams. 
3. Summary assessment
Forward-looking thinking is not institutionalised 
in the federal government or in environmental 
policymaking; nonetheless, forward-looking 
studies are regularly commissioned — often from 
federal agencies as well as external institutes on a 
case-by-case basis. Other studies are prepared by 
federal agencies and councils on their own initiative 
as part of their mandate to inform the policy process. 
Most of the studies carried out for the federal 
government have followed a quantitative approach 
with limited stakeholder consultation, though 
moves towards greater participation have been seen. 
A large number of forward-looking studies have 
been carried out in the areas of climate change and 
renewable energy in recent years, and these have 
had an impact on major recent policy decisions.
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3.6 Hungary
NB: Recent national elections in Hungary have made 
it difficult to gather information for this case study. 
It is hoped that the information presented here will 
be updated in the near future.
1. Institutional characteristics
(a) Formal horizontal coordination: Hungary is a 
parliamentary democracy, with a multi-party 
democratic system, with a unicameral National 
Assembly that elects the president and the prime 
minister. Hungary, as other central European 
countries, experienced a period of rapid and 
intensive social and economic transition from 
1989 onwards and joined the EU in May 2004.
(b) Formal vertical separation of powers: Hungary is 
divided into 20 counties, including the capital of 
Budapest. The counties are further subdivided 
into 174 districts. Since 1996, for statistical and 
economic development planning the counties 
have been grouped into seven regions.
(c) Executive–legislative relations: Hungary's 
government has separate legislative, executive 
and judicial powers. Legislative power is 
exercised by the National Assembly; executive 
power by the president and Cabinet of Ministers; 
and judicial power by the courts and tribunals. 
The Hungarian government only started to 
introduce forward-looking thinking in the 
mid-1990s, as in the years immediately following 
1989 there was an aversion to the long-term 
planning approach of the former regime. 
Elections were held in May 2010 and subsequent 
ministerial restructuring has made it difficult to 
establish clearly the current status of foresight 
within the Hungarian government.
(d) The electoral system: The previous one-party 
national political system was replaced by the 
parliamentary democratic system in 1989. The 
president is elected by the National Assembly 
(five-year term). The prime minister is also 
elected by the National Assembly of Ministers on 
the recommendation of the president.
2. Institutional settings/actors/mechanisms
(a) Main actors: A number of different institutions 
and organisations have been involved in 
specific forward-looking initiatives identified 
in Hungary. These include: the Hungarian 
Technology Foresight Programme led by 
the National Committee for Technological 
Development; the long-term National Sustainable 
Development Strategy coordinated by the 
National Development Agency in partnership 
with the former Ministry of Environment and 
Water; studies related to the National Energy 
Strategy drafted by the former Ministry of 
Economy and Trade; and studies linked to the 
National Climate Change Strategy, drafted by 
the former Ministry of Environment and Water. 
Outside of government, high-level officials from 
industry, universities and research institutions 
have been involved in futures elements of 
strategic planning, such as through steering 
groups in relation to the Technology Foresight 
Programme.
(b) Institutional basis: There is no legal requirement 
or policy obligation for futures work. The 
institutional basis for existing futures work has 
been relatively informal and linked with specific 
policy initiatives (e.g. technology foresight, 
sustainable development, energy policy). There 
is no centralised or formal foresight body within 
Hungary.
(c) Main mechanisms: There are no formalised 
mechanisms for futures work in Hungary. Rather, 
studies to date have been developed on an 
essentially ad-hoc basis.
Technology Foresight Programme — TEP
(National Committee for Technological 
Development, 1997–2003)
The key objective of TEP was to 'make a 
contribution to improving the long-term 
competitiveness of the country, resulting in 
a better quality of life'. Taking into account 
Hungary's ongoing fundamental economic and 
social changes during transition, the TEP also 
aimed to strengthen collaboration between 
different stakeholders, the public and private 
sectors, industry and academia.
The TEP identified key areas for Hungary's 
development, including: human resources; 
health and life sciences; IT; telecommunications 
and media; protection and development of the 
natural and built environment; manufacturing and 
business; agriculture and food; transport; energy.
In the assessment phase of the programme 
(1997–2000) a steering group and seven 
thematic panels analysed the existing situation, 
outlined scenarios for the future and made 
recommendations for implementation of the most 
favourable options.
In the implementation phase (2001–2003) 
results were disseminated to policymakers 
and other stakeholders together with specific 
recommendations for implementation.
Further information can be found in the country 
report (Annex 5).
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(d) Nature of processes: The processes adopted have 
differed between specific studies, reflecting the 
lack of formalised provision and requirements 
for forward-looking studies. The Technology 
Foresight Programme brought together experts 
from the scientific community, industry and 
public sectors in a participative approach, for 
example through workshops and a steering 
group. By contrast the Sustainable Development 
Strategy and other strategic policy documents 
have been developed within specific government 
institutions, and then presented as draft 
documents for public and stakeholder comment. 
In the case of the development of the energy 
policy, an external viewpoint was presented 
in a paper by a grouping of NGOs and other 
independent organisations: 'Sustainable Energy 
Strategy for Hungary — in relation to the long-
term energy strategy under development by the 
government'.
3. Summary assessment
Overall, future-oriented studies in Hungary have 
been developed on an ad-hoc, case-by-case basis. 
There is no centralised body with responsibility 
for conducting foresight studies, and no formal or 
informal programme of futures work. However, 
the Technology Foresight Programme in particular 
has influenced policymaking; so have studies in the 
areas of climate and energy.
National elections were held in Hungary in May 
2010 and subsequent ministerial restructuring has 
made it difficult to establish clearly the current 
status of foresight within government.
1997–2003 2004 2005 onwards
Hungarian Technology Foresight 
Programme (TEP), coordinated by the 
National Committee for Technological 
Development (OMFB)
National Office for Research and 
Technology (NKTH) established with 
responsibility (among other things) 
for the Mid-term Science Technology 
and Innovation Policy Strategy 
(2007–2013), which includes a 
forward-looking approach to strategic 
planning
The development of a number 
of national strategies includes 
forward-looking approaches/
elements, including: long-term 
National Sustainable Development 
Strategy (2007–2013); Hungarian 
energy policy (2007–2020); 
National Climate Change Strategy 
(2008-2025)
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3.7 Netherlands
1. Institutional characteristics
(a) Formal horizontal coordination: The Netherlands is 
a constitutional monarchy, with the monarch as 
head of state and a single executive with a prime 
minister and cabinet of ministers, consisting of 
heads of government departments. The bicameral 
States General (Staten Generaal) consists of the 
First Chamber, elected by provisional councils, 
and the Second Chamber, elected by popular 
vote.
(b) Formal vertical separation of powers: The 
Netherlands has a strong decentralised and 
corporatist tradition. Besides the 13 national 
departments/ministries, the country is divided 
into 12 administrative provinces which have a 
certain degree of regional autonomy in allocating 
funds and shaping policy. Dutch administrative/
governance culture is quite informal — the 
'power distance' is low — and generally highly 
participative.
(c) Executive–legislative relations: Forced by its 
geographical position, the Netherlands has a 
strong and long-standing tradition in long-term 
planning where its environment is concerned. 
This has resulted in a rather diffuse, though 
firmly institutionally embedded, network of 
agencies and research bodies that are concerned 
with futures studies, whose advice is by law to be 
taken seriously by policymakers.
(d) The electoral system: After recent intercalated 
elections (June 2010) and extensive formation 
efforts, the Netherlands has per October a 
coalition government of Christian Democrats 
and Liberals, with the far-right Peoples' Party for 
Freedom (PVV) of Geert Wilders in a 'permitting' 
role. The many efforts it took to form a coalition 
are a strong indication of the confusion in 
the Dutch political landscape. If this coalition 
and 'support act' is to stay, then the role of 
futures thinking to inform policymaking might 
drastically change in the Netherlands.
2. Institutional settings/actors/ mechanisms
(a) Main actors: The Netherlands does not have a 
principle, centralised futures or foresight body in 
government. Instead, it has a number of bodies 
within and outside government involved in 
long-term futures studies. In the environmental 
domain, the Environmental Assessment Agency 
(PBL) and the National Institute for Public Health 
and Environment (RIVM) are key agencies. 
Other general councils that have an important 
function with regard to environmental planning 
are the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
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Eururalis
The Eururalis project sought to answer a series of 
questions about the future of Europe's rural areas, 
including the effects of accession, the impacts of 
biofuels policy, and possible future developments 
of global and European markets. The study was 
undertaken by the Alterra Institute and the Land 
Dynamics Group, both at Wageningen University, 
together with the national Environmental 
Assessment Agency and the Agricultural 
Economics Institute.
The study looks to 2030 and develops four 
scenarios, closely based on IPCC scenarios: global 
economy, global cooperation, continental market, 
and regional communities. Among its conclusions, 
the study notes that global forces — including 
population and economic growth — will play a key 
role in shaping the future of Europe's rural areas. 
The project has so far had two iterations: 
Eururalis 1.0, released in 2004 under the Dutch 
Presidency of the EU Council, and Eururalis 2.0, 
released in 2007. A third version is currently 
under way.
Further information can be found in the country 
report (Annex 6).
Source: www.eururalis.nl
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Analysis (CPB) and the Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (WRR).
(b) Institutional basis: The publicly funded 
independent research agencies that carry 
out futures work are mostly permanent 
and embedded within the institutional 
structure, without losing a strong degree of 
independence. Futures thinking is incorporated 
into the normal policymaking process, and 
the institutional basis for most futures work 
is formal (legal requirement). An exception is 
the Delta Committee, which is an ad-hoc body. 
While this enables cooperation over various 
departments, and new forms of cooperation are 
certainly demanded in view of the increasing 
complexity and uncertainty of developments 
regarding environmental issues, the advice of 
the committee is no less embedded than that of 
permanent advisory organs (cf. the Delta Law).
(c) Main mechanisms: In the relationships between 
the agencies that perform futures work and the 
government, a systematic policy cycle is at work 
in which evaluative research, future-oriented 
research and policymaking go hand in hand; 
for example the environmental balances 
and outlooks provide input for the National 
Environmental Plan, ensuring that futures 
studies are incorporated into policymaking. 
In addition futures methodologies are well 
developed in the Netherlands: government 
bodies have taken a leading role in developing 
futures techniques, and as a result, many 
systematic methods and tools are available.
(d) Nature of processes: Major foresight studies are 
essentially science-based, though consultation 
and stakeholder participation is extensive in 
futures studies, as the Netherlands relies on 
consensus-building in its (environmental) 
policymaking. Since an integrated approach 
is often considered paramount in conducting 
futures studies, studies are usually a mixture of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, with the 
former forming the basis for the latter.
3. Summary assessment
Though futures work in the Netherlands is not 
institutionalised in a central body, the networks of 
agencies and research bodies that are concerned 
with futures studies are firmly embedded in the 
regular policy process and help improve the policy 
decisions. One specific major foresight study is 
very influential in informing environmental policy 
(Delta Plan II), particularly because it had ministerial 
support, i.e. clear policy demand. With the new 
government, though, the future of futures thinking 
in the Netherlands seems rather uncertain.
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3.8 Poland
1.  Institutional characteristics
(a) Formal horizontal coordination: Since the 
breakdown of the communist system in 1989, 
Poland has moved to a parliamentary democracy. 
The bicameral legislature consists of an upper 
house, the Senate, and a lower house, the Sejm.
(b) Formal vertical separation of powers: The Republic 
of Poland is a unitary state, though the Polish 
constitution of 2 April 2 1997 decentralises public 
power, transferring many political, fiscal and 
administrative tasks to subnational levels of 
government. The territory of Poland is divided 
into 16 voivodeships, 315 provinces, 65 urban 
provinces (cities with province status) and 2 478 
communes (gmina). Their autonomy varies: the 
main executive power in each voivodships is a 
representative of the Council of Ministers.
(c) Executive–legislative relations: Legislative power 
is vested in the Sejm and the Senate (bicameral 
parliament); executive power in the president as 
a head of state and in the Council of Ministers; 
and judicial power in the courts and tribunals. 
The Polish government centres on the Council of 
Ministers (the Cabinet), led and represented by 
the prime minister. In the current government, 
there are 17 ministries.
(d) The electoral system: The previous one-party 
national political system was replaced by the 
parliamentary democratic system in 1989. The 
president is elected by popular vote (five-year 
term), prime minister and deputy prime minister 
are appointed by the president and confirmed 
by the Sejm. Under the bicameral legislature, the 
Senate (upper house) is elected on a provincial 
basis (four-year terms) and the Sejm (lower 
house) is elected under a system of proportional 
representation.
2. Institutional settings/actors/mechanisms
(a) Main actors: Two bodies were founded in the 
1990s with responsibilities in long-term planning 
and strategic programming: the Council for 
Social and Economic Strategy (founded in 
1994) was an independent advisory body to 
the Council of Ministries; and the Government 
Centre for Strategic Studies (founded in 
1996) under the Council of Ministries and 
prime minister. Both of these institutions 
were dissolved in 2006. A National Foresight 
Programme covering sustainable development, 
ICT and safety was established in 2006, having 
been piloted in 2003. In addition the Committee 
for Development Policy Coordination at the 
Chancellery of the Prime Minister (created 
in 2009) and the Board of Strategic Advisors 
to the Prime Minister (created in 2008) have 
been established since 2006 to strengthen 
medium- and long-term policy programming 
and strategic thinking. The Ministry of 
Regional Development is playing a key role 
in the preparation of the Long-Term National 
Development Strategy. The Ministry of Science 
and Higher Education has also been important, 
developing the National Foresight Programme, 
focusing on technology and technological trends.
2003–2006 2006 2009
National Foresight Programme pilot 
in health and life research
Formal National Foresight Programme 
introduced, covering sustainable 
development, ICT and safety
Review and streamlining of strategic 
planning in Poland, and development 
of the 'Poland 2030' study
'Poland 2030' and the Long-Term National 
Development Strategy — Board of Strategic 
Advisors to the Prime Minister
The aim of the report Poland 2030 — 
Development challenges, published by the Board 
of Strategic Advisors to the Prime Minister in May 
2009, is to outline a perspective on potential 
routes for Poland's development in the next 
20 years. It focuses especially on the fields of 
economic and social policies, infrastructure, 
energy safety and efficient management of the 
administration.
The study draws on quantitative forecasts as well 
as qualitative analysis for Poland's future in areas 
including demographic changes, transport and 
energy. The study has been led by the Board of 
Strategic Advisors to the Prime Minister, which 
cooperates with the Chancellery of the Prime 
Minister (CPM) and the Ministry of Regional 
Development. Within CPM, a key office is the 
Department of Strategic Analyses, which will carry 
out long-term analysis and policy preparation.
The Development challenges report forms the 
basis for the development of the Long-Term 
National Development Strategy, which should be 
completed late in 2010.
Further information can be found in the country 
report (Annex 7).
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(b) Institutional basis: The Board of Strategic Advisors 
to the Prime Minister has responsibility for the 
development of the Long-Term Development 
Strategy for Poland. The Board of Strategic 
Advisors is an independent, consultative body. 
The Board of Strategic Advisors to the Prime 
Minister cooperates with the Chancellery of 
the Prime Minister (CPM) and the Ministry of 
Regional Development (MRD) (which contains 
a research and forecast centre). Within CPM, 
a key office is the Department of Strategic 
Analyses, which will carry out long-term analysis 
and policy preparation. Other institutions 
have played a role in policy-specific long-term 
planning, such as the Ministry of Economy 
which is the leading body in relation to energy 
policy (including forecasts to 2030). Current 
activities are geared towards creating broad 
strategic planning frameworks and processes. 
Environmental policy issues are not necessarily 
prominently featured within these frameworks.
(c) Main mechanisms: In 2009 the Committee for 
Development Policy Coordination carried out 
a review of government policies and strategies 
and proposed a plan to simplify and reorganise 
strategic and long-term planning. Under Poland's 
new approach to policy programming, MRD will 
prepare national medium-term socioeconomic 
and spatial planning programmes (i.e. with 
a time frame of 4 to 10 years), in cooperation 
with CPM, the Board of Strategic Advisors and 
other ministries. Individual ministers will then 
be responsible for the preparation of sectoral 
strategies and development programmes in 
their fields. The 'Poland 2030' study and the 
forthcoming Long-Term National Development 
Strategy are both important elements of the new 
approach.
(d) Nature of processes: The approaches used in three 
key studies have been rather different. The 
National Foresight Programme's 'Poland 2020' 
study used the participation of scientists and 
wider society in a debate about the future of 
Poland and used scenarios to illustrate possible 
alternative directions. The study on 'Poland 
2030' was prepared by a small group of experts 
inside government (coordinated by the Board of 
Strategic Advisors to the Prime Minister), using 
an analysis of past and current situations to 
provide recommendations for the government's 
long-term development strategy. The new 
energy policy is a sectoral strategy developed 
by the Ministry of Economy using external 
studies of the future energy situation. In general, 
government-led futures activities have followed 
rather traditional approaches to consultation 
and participation in content development. 
It is envisaged that the Board of Strategic 
Advisors will meet with the National Foresight 
Programme experts in the autumn of 2010 to 
exchange knowledge and experiences.
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3. Summary assessment
While there are specific, high-profile examples of 
futures thinking in relation to specific policy areas 
and broader strategic development planning in 
Poland, it is still not common practice to use such 
approaches. In addition the focus is on broader 
strategic and long-term planning rather than the 
environment. The National Foresight Programme 
has drawn on a broad range of techniques, 
although it is not apparent that these have been 
followed up or referred to in subsequent future-
oriented policy initiatives. The recent reform of 
national development programming is seen as 
having the potential to lead to more coordinated 
and comprehensive futures thinking in relation 
to policy (including environmental) making, by 
providing a framework that lasts beyond a single 
election cycle.
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3.9 Portugal
1. Institutional characteristics
(a) Formal horizontal coordination: Portugal is a 
parliamentary representative democracy, 
a republic since 1910, with the most recent 
republican constitution established in 1976. The 
president is head of state of a parliamentary 
representative democracy, and a prime 
minister heads a, currently, single-party 
cabinet government, consisting of individual 
ministers with sectoral decision power. The 
government in Portugal is highly hierarchical 
and compartmentalised, with weak horizontal 
coordination mechanisms between sectors and 
departments.
(b) Formal vertical separation of powers: Portugal is 
highly centralised, with only two autonomous 
administrative regions in the Atlantic islands of 
Madeira and Azores, which have most powers of 
national government replicated for their regional 
context, including legislative power and all issues 
pertaining to environment and spatial planning. 
In mainland Portugal some devolution of 
competences concerning environment and spatial 
planning towards the regional representative 
bodies of central government was undertaken 
a couple of years ago. Local municipalities 
also have a certain degree of environmental 
management and planning powers.
(c) Executive–legislative relations: Portugal does not 
have a strong tradition of using foresight to 
inform long-term policymaking and planning 
in public decision-making, although ad-hoc 
foresight studies are sectorally undertaken. In 
2007 the preparation of the National Strategic 
Reference Framework, that supported Portugal's 
medium-term planning and budgetary 
application to European Structural Funds, 
was supported by foresight studies developed 
for that purpose. Parliamentary commissions 
scrutinise government policies, namely through 
the activities of ministries where futures work is 
occasionally undertaken.
(d) The electoral system adopted by Portugal is the 
proportional system, with closed party-list; 
the voters vote in parties' lists. The seats are 
allocated by the d'Hondt formula; voting is not 
compulsory. The electoral rules have remained 
essentially unchanged from the first election in 
1975 to the constitution of 1976, the electoral law 
of 1979 and later revisions of the constitution. 
The single-Chamber Assembly is elected for a 
period of four years.
2. Institutional settings/actors/mechanisms
(a) Main actors: The Department of Foresight 
and Planning (Departamento de Prospectiva 
e Planeamento — DPP) established an economic 
and social Strategic Foresight Unit in 1995. From 
2007 the DPP was integrated into the Ministry 
responsible for environmental affairs. The DPP 
provides technical support to policy formulation, 
strategic and operational planning, supports 
inter-ministerial cooperation for environment 
and inter-sectoral policies at EU and international 
levels, and development cooperation. It also 
carries out foresight studies at the request 
of government institutions, particularly to 
assist the development of medium-term 
economic development plans, but restricted 
to central government planning. Typically 
when engaged in a foresight study, the DPP 
provides qualitative and quantitative scenario 
studies on the evolution of the Portuguese 
economy. Government institutions currently 
requesting foresight studies based on scenarios' 
development include the Council of Ministers 
and the Ministry of Environment, Spatial 
Planning and Regional Development.
POLIS programme (2000)
The POLIS programme was launched as a 
national programme for urban environmental 
rehabilitation policy, to improve the quality of life 
in cities, through key urban and environmental 
enhancement interventions.
The programme aimed at developing urban 
rehabilitation priorities, identifying models 
of intervention and reflecting on possible 
instruments for implementation, with particular 
focus on the improvement of urban environmental 
conditions and attractiveness.
Its work is based on informal foresight studies 
and brainstorming to discuss the key challenges 
and priorities, contributing to set the vision and 
conceptual framework for urban environmental 
rehabilitation.
The programme has been instrumental in shaping 
government policy and high-profile initiatives in 
urban rehabilitation, changing the image and the 
functionality of many cities. The POLIS model of 
governance has been used for the rehabilitation 
of coastal zones, and is now being applied also to 
rehabilitation of rivers. 
Further information can be found in the country 
report (Annex 8) and on the POLIS website 
(http://www.polis.maotdr.gov.pt/).
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(b) Institutional basis: Most futures work in Portugal 
is done by the DPP, either required by specific 
studies or seeking to pursue a DPP initiatives' 
agenda.
(c) Main mechanisms: In recent years the DPP 
has increased efforts to apply foresight to 
environmental decision-making, specifically 
related to the implementation of a sustainable 
development strategy for Portugal. This 
includes providing technical support associated 
with strategic and operational planning, and 
monitoring the evolution of economic, social 
and environmental indicators. Within the DPP 
there two units which use foresight to provide 
evidence to policymakers and to support strategy 
development: the Strategic Foresight Unit 
(evidence) and the Sustainable Development 
and Competitiveness Unit (evaluation of policy 
impact).
(d) Nature of processes: Stakeholder engagement in 
foresight studies is often limited to government 
and administrative officers, increasingly 
involving experts, consultants and academics, 
NGOs and the business sector. Key features 
include:
 •  limited amount of foresight work; generally 
located in one specific department;
 •  ad-hoc studies focused on modelling 
qualitative and quantitative economic 
scenarios; and
 •  when foresight is applied, it is used to provide 
evidence and inform policymakers.
3. Summary assessment
Formal foresight programmes designed for 
environmental policy are ad hoc in Portugal. There 
is effectively one national institution undertaking 
foresight studies at the request of government 
institutions, DPP — Departamento de Prospectiva 
e Planeamento — established in 1995. Foresight is 
not seen as a formal component of planning and 
policymaking. The relatively limited resources made 
available for foresight studies are also, perhaps, an 
indication of the importance that the government 
attributes to formal forecasting.
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3.10 Slovenia
1.  Institutional characteristics
(a) Formal horizontal coordination: Slovenia is a 
republic with a largely ceremonial president, 
a prime minister who presides over a cabinet 
government, and a parliament. 
(b) Formal vertical separation of powers: Slovenia 
has a centralised government. The country has 
two regions for the purpose of EU cohesion 
policy (eastern and western Slovenia), and the 
national government has debated the creation 
of administrative regions. Slovenia has over 
200 municipalities, of which the most important 
is Ljubljana with over 10 % of the country's 
population.
(c) Executive–legislative relations: The parliament is 
divided into two bodies, the National Assembly 
which has legislative power, and the National 
Council that brings together major economic 
and social interests (employers, employees, 
farmers, crafts, artists and others; and local 
interests, which hold just over half the seats). 
The parliament does not have a special body for 
futures studies, but it has followed work by the 
independent Bled Forum.
(d) The electoral system is proportional, and Slovenia 
has a multi-party system. Government coalitions 
form around two major parties, one on the 
centre-left and the other on the centre-right. 
Beyond the sometimes sharp political contrasts 
that draw also on major past events (including 
WWII and Yugoslav socialism), Slovenia has 
a strong corporatist framework involving 
negotiations among major interest groups, as 
seen in its National Council (though discussions 
often occur outside this structure).
2. Institutional settings/actors/mechanisms
(a) Main actors: Several government offices have 
prepared one-off futures studies. These have 
included: the former Government Office for 
European Affairs, which prepared 'Vision 
Slovenia' (2004); the Institute of Macroeconomic 
Analysis and Development, which developed 
Slovenia's development strategy to 2013; and the 
former Government Office for Growth, which 
prepared 'Development scenarios for Slovenia 
to 2013'. The Offices for European Affairs and 
Growth merged in 2008 into the Government 
Office for Development and European Affairs 
(GODEA), which has been involved in several 
recent futures-oriented initiatives. For example, 
GODEA is working closely with the Government 
Office on Climate Change. Thus, while a central 
office dedicated to futures does not exist in 
Slovenia, GODEA has taken a growing role in 
this type of analysis. Outside of government, the 
Bled Forum works on long-term thinking at both 
national and European levels.
(b) Institutional basis: No legal or policy obligation 
exists for futures studies.
(c) Main mechanisms: The futures work carried out 
thus far has been on an ad-hoc basis. Moreover, 
it appears that there has been little learning or 
exchange of information from one initiative to 
another.
(d) Nature of processes: Several studies have engaged 
stakeholders, for example in the definition of 
scenarios. Work on technology foresight has 
used a Delphi approach for input from experts 
in business, academia and other sectors. Outside 
of government, the Bled Forum has organised 
Europe-wide discussions on the future.
2004 2004–2005 2008
Qualitative scenarios used to develop 
'Vision Slovenia'
Technology foresight study 
commissioned by the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Sport and the 
Ministry of the Economy
Publication of 'Development 
scenarios for Slovenia to 2035: 
Trends and opportunities in times of 
climate change'
Development scenarios for Slovenia to 2035
This study reviewed climate change impacts 
projects for coming decades and then identified 
a series of actions for national climate change 
responses.
The study highlighted the importance of 
adaptation.
Slovenia's government has created an inter-
ministerial group to address climate change 
impacts as well as an action plan for agriculture 
and forestry: it does not appear, however, that 
there is a direct link between the study and these 
actions. 
Further information can be found in the country 
report (Annex 9).
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3. Summary assessment
Slovenia has carried out several future-oriented 
initiatives on an ad-hoc basis, and work is currently 
ongoing in the areas of a low-carbon economy 
and technology foresight. National science and 
technology policy was influenced by work on 
technology foresight, which helped to identify 
national research priorities. While other initiatives 
have as yet had less influence on policymaking, 
the link that current and recent studies have had to 
national development strategies through GODEA 
provides the opportunity for a growing role of 
forward-looking analysis.
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3.11 Spain 
1. Institutional characteristics
(a) Formal horizontal coordination: Spain is a 
parliamentary monarchy, with a king as head of 
state and a bicameral parliament — the Cortes 
Generales. The executive power is formed by a 
Council of Ministers headed by the president. 
The legislative power is based in the Cortes 
Generales and consists of a lower chamber — 
Congreso de los Diputados — and an upper 
chamber — the Senate.
(b) Formal vertical separation of powers: Spain has a 
pseudo-federal system, with a large degree of 
devolution of competencies to its 17 autonomous 
communities. The degree of devolution depends 
on the 'statutes of autonomy' negotiated between 
each region and the central government. The 
regions with the highest degree of devolution 
are Catalonia and the Basque Country. Some 
autonomous communities are in the process 
of negotiating new statutes of autonomy, the 
tendency being to try to get larger degrees of 
devolution, albeit the negotiation processes 
are not short of controversy. Aspects such as 
environmental policy tend to correspond to 
the regions, although areas of national interest 
(e.g. nuclear power, national motorways, coasts) 
remain under the central government.
(c) Executive–legislative relations: There is no 
formal mandate for the executive to engage 
in forward-looking activities. Parliament may 
scrutinise futures studies associated to national 
policy, as was going to be the case with the 
national energy prospective study. Other 
futures studies commissioned by government 
departments are not normally discussed at 
parliament level.
(d) Two political parties dominate the electoral 
scene: the Socialist Party (PSOE) and the 
right-wing Partido Popular (PP). Often no party 
holds absolute majority, and thus compromises 
have to be reached with other parties to secure 
approval of national policies and legislation. 
Interestingly these smaller parties tend to 
represent regional nationalist interests — mainly 
from Catalonia and the Basque Country. Political 
parties normally form parliamentary groups.
2. Institutional settings/actors/mechanisms
(a) Main actors: There is neither a central body 
for coordination, formal intra-governmental 
networks nor a specific parliamentary body 
dealing with foresight studies. Main actors are 
the Observatory for Technological Industrial 
Foresight (OPTI), the National Agency for 
Foresight and Evaluation (ANEP), the Unit 
of Analysis and Foresight of the Ministry of 
Environment (UAP), and the Observatory 
for Sustainability in Spain (OSE). OPTI is a 
foundation under the auspices of the Ministry of 
1995 1997 2005 2006
National Agency for 
Evaluation and Foresight 
is established in 1987, 
but does not conduct 
foresight work until 1995
Ministry of Industry 
and Energy creates 
the Observatory for 
Technological Industrial 
Foresight
Observatory for Sustainability 
in Spain created by agreement 
between the then Ministry 
of Environment, the General 
Foundation of the University 
of Alcalá and the Biodiversity 
Foundation
Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food 
creates the Unit of 
Analysis and Foresight
A prospective study of renewable energies 
(Observatory of Occupations, Public Service 
of State Employment, 2010)
Spain has placed emphasis on the development 
of renewable energies under its National Energy 
Plan, and is now a leading country in this sector. 
Growth in this area is expected, with opportunities 
for generation of (mainly skilled) employment. 
The study aimed at identifying the occupations 
that are emerging, the job descriptions and the 
new professional skills where training is required, 
as well as anticipating the growth in employment 
expected in the next few years.
The foresight study provided a mapping of 
employment in the sector, and identified 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
for the different renewable energies. It identified 
occupations were employment will be created and 
carried out a training needs assessment.
The study is expected to guide the government 
and private sector to make best use of the 
opportunities for employment foreseen in the 
sector, which will also help in securing a green 
and competitive economy in line with the Europe 
2020 strategy.
Further information can be found in the country 
report (Annex 10).
The report is available in Spanish and English at: 
http://www.redtrabaja.es/es/redtrabaja/static/
Redirect.do?page=af09.
Lessons from Member States
BLOSSOM — A cross-country analysis 43
Industry, Tourism and Trade; its clients include 
government bodies. ANEP is based under the 
Secretary of State for Universities (Ministry of 
Science and Innovation); however, its work has 
centred on evaluation of project proposals, with 
little attention paid to foresight. UAP was created 
under the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food, which later merged with the Ministry of 
Environment, but its work retains a focus on 
agriculture and rural development. It produces 
analysis reports and carries out other foresight 
analyses for internal consumption. OSE activities 
are not strictly foresight, based mainly on 
the monitoring of sustainable development 
indicators, but nevertheless trends are studied 
and recommendations for policymaking 
advanced. Other public bodies have sections 
that engage in foresight activities, such as the 
Observatory of Occupations from the Public 
Service for State Employment's. Other foresight 
studies are done outside formally established 
foresight bodies, by regional level or private 
bodies.
(b) Institutional basis: The institutional basis for 
futures work is informal (no legal requirement).
(c) Main mechanisms: Although there are bodies 
whose mandate includes carrying out foresight 
studies, these are not a key component of their 
activities, and there are no permanent futures 
programmes established. Foresight studies with 
larger implications for national policymaking, 
and touching on sensitive issues of electoral 
interest, are very limited and can become highly 
politicised, as shown by the relatively recent 
foresight study on energy policy, whose results 
were never disclosed. Most other foresight 
studies are 'consultancy' style and taken as 
independent recommendations for policymaking, 
even if commissioned by government bodies.
(d) Nature of processes: The processes used in 
foresight studies are mainly expert-led, with 
participation mainly insofar as consultation of 
key stakeholders is concerned, as part of the 
methods employed (e.g. Delphi surveys). A mix 
of quantitative and qualitative methods is used. 
3. Summary assessment
Futures studies have become more sophisticated 
in recent years, using more rigorous methods and 
a wide range of experts. The policy areas where 
foresight is applied has also expanded. Nevertheless 
there is no central futures programme and futures 
work is generally limited to ad-hoc commissioned 
studies. Furthermore some foresight studies by 
government bodies are produced only for internal 
consumption.
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Technically there is currently no futures work 
related to environmental policymaking. However, 
some futures-type work around monitoring 
trends related to sustainable development does 
exist. The high level of regionalisation and 
compartmentalisation acts as a constraint to 
develop cross-sector working mechanisms; this may 
suppress the extent to which a futures approach to 
environmental policymaking could be employed. 
Futures studies to date have been ad hoc, with little 
evidence of (formal) cooperation or communication 
between those involved in different studies. 
However, where futures studies have been publicly 
available they have been used by a wide range 
of stakeholders, indicating that there is a latent 
demand for such futures work.
Lessons from Member States
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3.12 Sweden
1. Institutional characteristics
(a) Formal horizontal coordination: Sweden is a 
constitutional monarchy based on parliamentary 
democracy, with a monarch and chief of state, 
a prime minister and a cabinet government, 
appointed by the prime minister. The 
parliamentary system is unicameral. The 
government is assisted in its work by the 
government offices, comprising a number of 
ministries, and some 300 central government 
agencies and public administrations.
(b) Formal vertical separation of powers: Sweden is 
divided into 21 counties. Political tasks at this 
level are undertaken, on the one hand, by the 
county councils, whose decision-makers are 
directly elected by the people of the county 
and, on the other, by the county administrative 
boards which are government bodies in the 
counties. Some public authorities also operate at 
regional and local levels, for example through 
county boards. Sweden has 290 municipalities. 
Each municipality has an elected assembly, the 
municipal council, which takes decisions on 
municipal matters.
(c) Executive–legislative relations: Legislative 
powers are held by the Swedish parliament 
(the Riksdag). Proposals for new laws are 
presented by the government which also 
implements legislative decisions taken by 
the Riksdag. Sweden has an egalitarian and 
decentralised model of management and 
approach to governance. This can be seen in the 
structure of government. Swedish ministries are 
relatively small and focus on policymaking. They 
prepare policy decisions for agencies to carry out, 
but do not (and cannot) issue direct orders. Thus, 
government agencies act independently to carry 
out the policies of the Swedish government.
(d) The electoral system: Election to the parliament 
(Riksdag) is by popular vote on a proportional 
representation basis (four-year terms).
2. Institutional settings/actors/mechanisms
(a) Main actors: Future-oriented studies are 
undertaken in many parts of Swedish 
government. In 1980 the government created 
the Secretariat for Future Studies, which became 
an independent body in 1987: the Institute for 
Future Studies. The institute is not, however, 
a central body for future-oriented studies. 
The forward-looking Environmental Quality 
Objectives (EQOs) provide a formal framework 
for environmental programmes and initiatives, 
Early 
1970s
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the Research 
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Committee
Research 
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Sweden in the year 2021 — Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
On the initiative of the Swedish EPA the 'Sweden 
in the year 2021' programme was launched in 
January 1993 and finished five years later in 
1998. The aim was to accomplish an intersectoral 
and interdisciplinary study for the purpose of 
identifying environmentally sustainable futures for 
Sweden.
The ensuring project was characterised by the 
fact that:
• a system analytical approach was used in a 
comprehensive research and investigative 
task within a public authority; this was an 
interdisciplinary project with a focus on 
natural- and social-scientific issues;
• a large number of actors — researchers, public 
servants and representatives of various sectors 
in society — were engaged in the project; all 
in all, some 300 people took part in the work.
Following its publication, the study was used 
to support the establishment of Sweden's 
Environmental Quality Objectives.
Further information is available in the country 
report (Annex 11).
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with timescales to 2010, 2020 and 2050. Work 
relating to the EQOs was coordinated by an 
Environmental Objectives Council. In June 
2010, a government bill introduced a number of 
institutional changes to the system around the 
EQOs: the Environmental Objectives Council 
was replaced with a parliamentary commission 
and the work on the EQOs reorganised to 
focus more on implementation and impact 
analysis than on follow-up. The Swedish case 
study report indicates that in practice many 
agencies in Sweden have some form of foresight 
activity. In relation to the environment, the 
leading government body is the Ministry of 
the Environment. The Swedish Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has also produced 
foresight studies. Other bodies involved in 
future-oriented work (in particular relating to 
the EQOs) include: the Swedish National Board 
for Health and Welfare; the National Heritage 
Board; the Energy Agency; the Forest Agency; the 
Board of Agriculture; and the National Board of 
Housing, Building and Planning.
(b) Institutional basis: One of the key characteristics 
in Sweden is that future-oriented work is carried 
out independently by many different bodies in 
the public sector, as reflected under '(a) Main 
actors'.
(c) Main mechanisms: Future-oriented studies play an 
important role in Sweden's environmental policy, 
and in particular for the country's Environmental 
Quality Objectives (EQOs). These objectives set 
targets across 16 environmental themes. The 
Swedish government approved the targets in 
1999 and they were endorsed by parliament the 
same year in a resolution: the EQOs thus have a 
formal status in terms of Swedish environmental 
policy, though they are not legally binding. 
The EQOs define the state of environment and 
provide a coherent framework for environmental 
programmes and initiatives at national, regional 
and local levels.
(d) Nature of processes: Major futures studies related 
to the environment have involved a high level of 
participation, typically involving representatives 
from a broad range of national government 
bodies and from key stakeholder groups such 
as local government, industry, agriculture and 
environmental NGOs. For example, in the work 
to prepare the study on 'Sweden in the year 
2021', representatives participated in 10 sectoral 
groups that played a key role in formulating 
future visions. A participative process is also 
embedded in the EQOs: here, the Environmental 
Objectives Council is made up of representatives 
from a broad array of stakeholders. In addition 
futures methods in Sweden typically combine 
quantitative and qualitative methods. 
3. Summary assessment
Overall while there is no central body for foresight 
studies in Sweden there has been a considerable 
amount of futures work carried out and much 
of this has been in relation to environmental 
planning and policy. Many government bodies 
commission studies on an ad-hoc basis. As a result, 
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the relationship between different programmes and 
studies appears to be largely informal. However, 
the Swedish Environmental Quality Objectives have 
provided a formalised framework for environmental 
planning in Sweden and have led to considerable 
cross-agency and broader participative working 
through the large number of specific studies 
being commissioned. Particularly in relation to 
the development and evaluation of the EQOs, 
future-oriented studies can be seen to have a strong 
influence on environmental policy in Sweden. 
A high level of government commitment to the 
environment and related future-oriented studies, 
a strong history of participation and engagement 
and good sectoral integration are seen as particular 
success factors.
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3.13 United Kingdom
1. Institutional characteristics
(a) Formal horizontal coordination: The United 
Kingdom is a bicameral parliamentary 
democracy, with a monarch as head of state 
and a single executive with a prime minister 
and cabinet government, consisting of heads of 
government departments. The prime minister is 
supported through the strong coordinating role 
of the Prime Minister's Office/Cabinet Office.
(b) Formal vertical separation of powers: The United 
Kingdom is highly centralised, though with 
devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland over a variety of functions. The 
recently elected (May 2010) coalition government 
is promoting a 'localism' agenda which may seek 
to devolve some responsibility to local authorities 
and is likely to lead to a wider variety of 
approaches to plan-making and decision-making, 
especially in relation to the environment and 
spatial planning.
(c) Executive–legislative relations: Parliament 
has no formal mandate to engage actively 
in forward-looking activities, although 
parliamentary select committees scrutinise the 
activities of government departments where 
futures work is undertaken and may from time to 
time consider such activities. The Parliamentary 
Office of Science and Technology is only recently 
beginning to provide information in this area for 
parliamentarians.
(d) The electoral system is currently first-past-the-post 
for general elections, although the coalition 
government has promised a referendum on 
an alternative vote (AV) form of proportional 
representation. The current coalition government 
consists of Conservative and Liberal Democrats, 
with Labour the main opposition party. The 
coalition government is the first time the 
Conservatives have been in power for 13 years; 
previously they were in power for 18 years. 
The United Kingdom has a tendency to swing 
from one political colour to another periodically, 
favoured by the first-past-the-post system. 
2. Institutional settings/actors/mechanisms
(a) Main actors: The Foresight Programme and 
its Horizon Scanning Centre are part of the 
Government Office for Science contained within 
the Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS) and this acts as a central body for 
futures work and increasingly is seeking to 
provide a coordination role. It is headed by 
the government's Chief Scientific Advisor 
Other key ministries and agencies undertaking 
environmental futures work are the Department 
of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra), the Environment Agency of England 
and Wales, and Natural England. In Scotland, 
Scotland's Futures Forum (SFF) was established 
in 2006 by the Scottish parliament to promote 
'aspirational futures', to challenge policy and to 
increase the ability of members of the Scottish 
parliament (MSPs) and the wider Scottish 
community to consider future challenges and 
opportunities.
1994 2002 2004 2005 2006
UK Foresight 
Programme 
established
Defra Horizon 
Scanning Unit 
established
Environment Agency 
Foresight Unit 
established
Foresight Horizon 
Scanning Centre 
established
Natural England 
Foresight Unit 
established
Tackling obesities: 'Future choices' project 
(Foresight, 2007)
'To produce a long-term vision of how we can 
deliver a sustainable response to obesity in the 
United Kingdom over the next 40 years.'
The Foresight obesity project was noted as 
providing a clearer understanding of the 
complexity and scale of the obesity problem. 
The project shifted the focus from obesity, to 
promoting healthy weight, healthy lives and 
recognising that weight is a problem that affects 
both adults and children. The findings of the 
report demonstrated the need for a commitment 
to tackling obesity across government. 
It highlighted the breadth of the science 
underpinning weight issues and approaches to 
tackling them. 
The study has been instrumental in shaping 
government policy and high-profile initiatives, 
e.g. the Obesity Strategy (2008), by the 
Department of Health following strong ministerial 
ownership of the study. Increasingly there is wider 
recognition of the need for joined-up thinking 
across government, in relation to health, exercise, 
open space, environment and transport, though 
delivering cross-departmental actions has been 
slower.
Further information is available in the country 
report (Annex 12).
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(b) Institutional basis: The institutional basis for most 
futures work is generally rather informal by 
intra-governmental political agreement (no legal 
requirement).
(c) Main mechanisms: The Foresight Programme is 
permanent and has existed since 1994. In other 
departments, environmental futures work may 
be overseen by a handful of staff or less, who in 
some cases provide 'consultancy' style advice 
to policymakers to help them integrate futures 
work into day-to-day policymaking. Generally, 
major futures work through Foresight is driven 
politically (though it includes external advisors) 
and this is seen as essential to its success in 
delivering benefits to policymaking.
(d) Nature of processes: Major foresight studies 
are essentially expert-led, though with wider 
stakeholder participation. Consultation is 
extensive in most futures work with a permanent 
stakeholder panel to help the central foresight 
body identify emerging issues and decide on 
strategic priorities. Departmental/agency studies 
are used mainly for internal purposes, but may 
engage stakeholders as well. In the United 
Kingdom there appears to be a distinction 
between futures work being used as part of 
'evidence' gathering (e.g. Foresight, Defra, 
Environment Agency) or as part of business 
planning/strategy (Natural England). Studies 
use a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches, the largest studies using modelling, 
for example to underpin the science, while 
smaller studies undertaken within departments 
tend generally to be more qualitative, with a 
narrative used to explore possible futures. 
3. Summary assessment
Overall, the relationship between different 
departmental futures programmes is patchy, 
strongest when departments are stakeholders 
in large foresight studies. There are, however, 
good networks of futures practitioners and 
policymakers, which have been established as part 
of departmental futures studies and through the 
HSC's networks. A few specific, major foresight 
studies have been influential in informing 
environmental policy (flooding) and health policy 
(obesity), particularly because they have had 
ministerial support, i.e. clear policy demand; but 
this also makes studies susceptible to changes in 
politics or individual ministers. Good collaboration 
and follow-up with other relevant departments 
facilitates effective uptake of findings by the relevant 
people. The embedded nature of futures work in 
some departments helps improve policymaking 
although there is a need for more social scientists 
in government departments to facilitate the 
implementation of policy changes.
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Embedding futures thinking in policymaking
4.1 Introduction
From the individual country reports the 
cross-country analysis was undertaken to identify 
patterns, trends, commonalities and diversity 
among the approaches to futures thinking adopted 
in the selected Member States. Taking into account 
that the nature of this research has been at a high 
strategic level, the cross-country analysis sought 
to identify, first, the broad timelines for significant 
developments in the institutional and governance 
arrangements for futures thinking in Member States, 
and, second, to draw out the main commonalities 
and divergences in the practice of using futures 
thinking in environmental policymaking.
While every attempt has been made to ensure that 
this study has been as comprehensive as possible, it 
is also important to note that the research presented 
here represents an understanding of the approaches 
and institutional set-up of environmental futures 
thinking in the Member States, based on analysis of 
the individual case study reports for each country. 
This research should not therefore be seen as 
exhaustive in nature and it is possible that certain 
specific elements have been inadvertently omitted 
from the analyses, for example important dates 
in the development of a futures approach or key 
studies. The case study reports also represent a 
snapshot in time and in a dynamic area like this 
institutional structures are often subject to constant 
change, as is revealed in a number of the case study 
countries.
4.2 Development of futures thinking 
over time
From the country summaries it can be seen that 
futures thinking has very different histories in 
the countries studied. Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
pattern of introduction across the case studies of 
4 Embedding futures thinking in 
policymaking
Figure 4.1 Year of introduction of a central foresight/futures body/department
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central foresight bodies, while Figure 4.2 illustrates 
the cumulative diffusion of the introduction of 
these central foresight bodies over recent decades. 
Note that Hungary and Slovenia do not have a 
central foresight body and are thus not included in 
Figure 4.1.
The figures above illustrate only the introduction of 
central futures bodies. An important caveat here is 
that the existence of a central futures body does not 
mean that other futures work is not going on, nor 
does the existence of a body imply that that body is 
actually undertaking a significant amount of futures 
work. The figures above also do not necessarily 
ascribe any virtue to the early introduction of a 
central body, thus it is not a priori considered 'better' 
to have developed a central body at any particular 
time. A central body/organisation can take many 
forms — it may be part of central government or 
it may be an external body, such as an academic 
institute. Portugal, for example, has had a central 
foresight planning department of government since 
1953, while the United Kingdom (considered to have 
quite extensive experience of foresight and futures 
work) has only had a central government body 
since 1994. Although there is no central government 
futures body in Germany, futures work is widely 
diffused in government, and in 2009 the Institute on 
Advanced Studies in Sustainability was established 
where futures work is undertaken.
Figure 4.2 shows a peak in the number of countries 
introducing central government bodies in the early 
and mid-1990s. From an environmental point of 
view this might be seen as particularly relevant in 
the wake of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 and the 
need to advance plans and strategies for sustainable 
development. In the case of Austria, the case study 
indicates that the increasing visibility of quite 
specific environmental issues, such as the effects on 
forests of acid rain, in the 1970s and 1980s led to the 
environment rising up the political agenda, and thus 
influenced the introduction of structured long-term 
thinking in relation to the environment. However, 
in most cases government foresight has tended to 
begin with a focus on technology foresight and links 
to business. Areas such as energy and transport may 
provide the link into further exploration of natural 
resource and environmental issues.
A common pattern observed across those countries 
with relatively mature futures programmes 
(e.g. the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden) 
was the evolution from initial early futures 
studies to the building of a network of expertise 
across government and externally, to developing 
incrementally the capacity within government 
departments to undertake their own futures work 
as part of the normal policymaking process, for 
example through capacity building and training. 
One might expect that futures work develops 
incrementally in this way, but in some countries 
futures work has had mixed fortunes and developed 
more haphazardly (e.g. in France). Reorganisation 
of government departments can disrupt foresight 
programmes and lose skills and capacity, and 
political interest will vary according to other 
priorities and individuals.
4.3 Commonalities and diversity among 
Member State approaches
Figure 4.3 illustrates the numbers of countries 
in which specific formal provisions for futures 
thinking have been made in relation to institutional 
Figure 4.2 Cumulative diffusion of central futures bodies in 12 EU Member States
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Figure 4.3 Number of countries with specific provisions — (a) institutions, (b) process and 
(c) mechanisms
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arrangements, processes and mechanisms 
respectively, out of the sample of 12 EU Member 
States. Each of these provisions for futures thinking 
is discussed in Section 2.1.
On the basis of the overview analysis above, and 
the case study reports, a simple typology of the 
relative 'maturity' of futures work in relation to 
environmental policy can be developed into which 
the countries studied can be categorised (see 
Figure 4.4), based on:
• most mature:
 -  most permanent and formalised systems, 
diverse networks across government, and 
experience of futures studies having clear 
influence on policy;
• those where futures arrangements are in the 
process of developing:
 -  some features have been introduced and show 
evidence of lasting structures and influence; 
and
• those that are least mature and in their infancy — 
nascent:
 -  mainly ad-hoc or fragmented arrangements, 
or very recent introduction of institutional 
structures or governance arrangements 
to facilitate futures thinking into policy at 
national government level. 
From this clustering there is a clear northern 
European dimension to the most mature systems. 
Figure 4.4 Relative maturity of futures 
arrangements in 12 EU Member 
States
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For Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands this 
might also reflect the more participatory prevailing 
governance culture in those countries whereas 
the United Kingdom, while it is less participatory 
culturally, does have a strong environmental 
movement and external advocacy tradition, as well 
as strong centralised government and policymaking.
The countries with developing futures arrangements 
reflect more a northern/central European focus 
with the exception of Portugal, although here the 
common thread may be the more academic tradition 
of La Prospective shared with France. Germany is 
also a highly federal state and therefore experience 
is likely to be more fragmented.
The countries with nascent futures arrangements 
are dominated by central and eastern European 
countries (where there may remain a distrust of 
long-term planning processes in the post-Soviet 
era), with the exception of Spain, which is particular 
in that it is highly federal in its approach and 
where foresight has been strongest in the technology 
field.
4.3.1 Institutions
Central foresight body
A centralised body appears from the case studies to 
be an important factor in terms of bringing futures 
thinking into policymaking, and most countries 
have adopted some sort of central government body. 
The Netherlands and Sweden are exceptions to this 
rule, with diffuse structures and networks, but a 
strong role for futures studies; this appears to be 
due to their governance culture and the resulting 
more diffuse government structures. In between 
these approaches, Germany, for example, tends to 
rely on futures studies prepared by independent 
organisations (though generally commissioned by 
the government). Although there is active foresight/
futures work in the French administration, and a 
long-standing tradition in France of La Prospective, 
the findings of the work do not seem to have been 
widely diffused in government.
Some major policy issues will always need strong 
cross-government/central impetus to provide the 
necessary kick-start to policy change and/or to 
generate the evidence to support and underpin 
policy. The example in the United Kingdom of the 
Foresight obesity report (13) appears to be a case 
(13) Tackling obesity: Future choices (2007) (http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/current-projects/tackling-obesities).
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where a foresight study has highlighted a current 
policy issue. The implications for government 
departments from health to transport, environment, 
and not least the Treasury (in terms of costs of ill-
health) of the increasing trend to obesity among 
citizens is a policy issue that had been recognised 
for two decades, but which had failed to gain 
ground in government until the obesity study. It 
was both the process and the outcome — along with 
the convergence of a number of other factors — 
that provided such overwhelming evidence that 
government action became unavoidable. It has since 
underpinned major health and open space initiatives 
across government, including cooperation between 
the Department of Health and Natural England 
(the government agency in charge of biodiversity 
conservation and countryside access).
Strong central bodies can be found in the United 
Kingdom, Finland, and France, but reflect different 
approaches. In Finland, for example the Government 
Foresight Network is coordinated by the Prime 
Minister's Office (PMO) and is therefore at the heart 
of government. In the United Kingdom, while a 
strong central body exists in UK Foresight, this 
is (currently) located in the Business, Innovation 
and Skills Department, but its location has been 
somewhat peripatetic over the years, depending 
upon where the responsibility for 'science' has 
rested. While a key strength of the futures work 
done by UK Foresight is the buy-in by government 
departments and ministers, it is not, for example, 
located in the Cabinet Office — the equivalent of 
the PMO in Finland — at the heart of government 
(although the Cabinet Office does carry out its 
own futures work). In France the futures studies 
departments are close to central government and, 
particularly since recent reorganisation, are within a 
powerful Super-Ministry and affiliated to the Prime 
Minister's Office.
The Netherlands shows an alternative approach: 
it has several strong agencies that carry out futures 
work. These include publicly funded independent 
research organisations and agencies, operating 
at arm's length from central government or fully 
independently (e.g. the Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis and the Scientific Council 
for Government Policy). While located under 
ministries, these agencies have a strong degree of 
independence.
The question of a central body is linked also to the 
issue of internal or external expertise. In nearly all 
the case studies, internal government offices played 
a key role in developing forward-looking initiatives. 
In many cases, government offices have coordinated 
external expertise, for example from universities 
and consultancies. This appears necessary in order 
for a study to have impact within government: for 
example, external expertise played a strong role 
in two of the futures studies reviewed in Slovenia; 
while both represented new initiatives for the 
country, they had a relatively small influence on 
policy.
An interesting question arises as to whether 
different traditions in the way in which the 
science-policy debate is played out in a particular 
country, for example whether a strong quantitative 
tradition in natural sciences predominates or a 
more qualitative, participative tradition exists, 
make a difference as to where a central body is 
located and the nature of that central body. In the 
United Kingdom, it has already been noted that UK 
Foresight is located within the government Office for 
Science in the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills. It is headed by the Government's Chief 
Scientific Advisor and reflects a strong sense of the 
use of rigorous science to inform policy, particularly 
in the context of environmental and natural science 
issues. This might be contrasted with the central 
bodies located in or close to a prime minister's office 
(as in Finland and France), with less focus on science 
per se and more on the use of futures for informing 
policy and long-term government strategy. This may 
also be reflected in the way in which futures issues 
are addressed in other departments and agencies 
(see below).
Parliamentary body/role of parliament
Some of the case studies, notably Finland, have 
shown that parliament can play an important role 
in supporting futures thinking. Futures work might 
be able to influence political discussions without 
a formal parliamentary function — this appears to 
have been the case in Slovenia, for example. Overall, 
however, the case studies do not provide enough 
material for clear lessons here, not least because in 
some countries parliamentary advice and support, 
as in France through the Delegation on Future 
Perspectives, is a very recent initiative. However, 
Austria and Germany also have parliamentary 
bodies with some level of responsibility for 
futures, although not formal committees. This 
may reflect the scrutiny role for parliaments in 
holding government departments and ministries 
to account. Since futures work is a relatively recent 
innovation among government departments and 
the executive, it should perhaps not be surprising 
that parliaments have not yet, in the main, mirrored 
these developments. Parliamentary committees 
may well address futures issues as part of their 
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day-to-day scrutiny of government, but where 
foresight and futures thinking has traditionally 
been viewed as part of natural science traditions 
and operational departments (e.g. in terms of 
quantitative forecasting and modelling), it may 
have been seen as 'expert' science and therefore the 
responsibility of the executive and bureaucratic 
departments, rather than parliamentarians. In 
the United Kingdom, the All Party Parliamentary 
Groups — which aim to engender progressive and 
informed debate on specific issues by bridging the 
gap between policymakers and practitioners in a 
particular field — offer the opportunity to consider 
futures issues.
Information provision to members of parliament on 
scientific and technological issues is often through 
parliamentary technology assessment offices (14) 
and futures issues will often feature as part of the 
projects they undertake to inform members of 
parliament. However, these have not necessarily 
been staffed by experts in long-term futures. In 
Scotland (distinctively from the rest of the United 
Kingdom), the Scottish Futures Forum provides a 
network for information exchange and advice to 
members of the Scottish parliament, though it is not 
a formal parliamentary body.
Internal body
Most countries have some form of futures work 
being undertaken within government departments 
(whether a regular or ad-hoc occurrence), although 
not all have a central body that coordinates 
or advises across government. The Finnish 
Environment Institute (SYKE) provides strategic 
guidance to government ministries (decentralised). 
In France, the FSM provides foresight related to 
sustainable development. In the United Kingdom, 
the UK Foresight Programme and its Horizon 
Scanning Centre provide support and advice 
to other government departments, although 
some departments also have their own foresight 
capacity. Hungary has recently established its own 
Technology Foresight Programme. In Sweden and 
the Netherlands there is no one body providing 
foresight in government.
In the United Kingdom, independent scientific 
advisory committees help government departments 
in the collection of scientific information and also in 
making judgments on the information (performing 
effectively an 'honest broker' role). By its very nature 
their activities can involve both informal and formal 
horizon-scanning activities.
External body
In the Netherlands, where no single centralised 
body deals with foresight, there are a number of 
external bodies/agencies that engage in undertaking 
and commissioning futures work, such as the 
Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) and 
the National Institute for Public Health and 
Environment (RIVM). Other ad-hoc bodies exist, 
such as the Delta Committee.
In the United Kingdom, the Environment Agency 
and Natural England are external bodies (they are 
formally non-departmental public bodies, though 
funded by government) with their own foresight 
and horizon-scanning capacities, which feed into the 
sponsoring department (Defra), but have a degree of 
independence in their operational use of futures.
In Slovenia, the Bled Strategic Forum, which works 
on long-term thinking at national and European 
levels, has sponsored debates about long-term 
futures held in Bled, Slovenia, drawing thinkers 
from politics, industry and academia from all 
over Europe. The most recent was held in August 
2010 to discuss some major challenges under the 
title 'The global outlook for the next decade'. Such 
external activities can help provide the impetus for 
developing further national capacity and studies 
where it is not already in existence.
External bodies with futures responsibilities 
appear to flourish where there are also internal 
bodies within government and as a substitute 
where futures thinking is still in its infancy within 
government.
Examples of parliamentary bodies/roles and 
relationships with central government
Finland: Government Foresight Network/Prime 
Minister’s Office; Parliamentary Committee for the 
Future.
France: Foresight Studies Mission (FSM) in 
the Environment Super-Ministry and Centre 
of Strategic Analysis (CSA) affiliated to the 
Prime Minister's Office; Delegation on Future 
Perspectives in the Senate.
(14) See, for example, the European Parliamentary Technology Assessment Network (http://www.eptanetwork.org/).
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4.3.2 Process
Routine stakeholder involvement
The degree of consultation varies between countries, 
with Finland and Austria at one end of the scale 
with a high degree of participation and France on 
the other with comparatively little. Generally the 
foresight topics are determined through consultation 
with expert stakeholders. Germany does not 
generally have much stakeholder engagement in 
futures, but its Sustainable Development Strategy, 
which is the high-level strategy with a futures 
perspective, has extensive stakeholder consultation.
Stakeholder participation is widespread among 
most futures programmes across the Member 
States studied. This reflects good practice and in 
fact is being driven by policy needs, which reflects 
good policymaking practice anyway, reinforced by 
requirement of the UNECE Aarhus Convention, and 
the EU public participation Directive 2003/35/EC, for 
early and effective participation in environmental 
decision-making.
There appears still to be a strong emphasis on 
expert-driven futures processes even while at 
the same time making provision for considerable 
levels of stakeholder and (less commonly) public 
engagement. For example, studies in Finland, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom have combined expert analysis, including 
quantitative modelling, with stakeholder processes 
in developing scenarios (see box above)
However, in most cases the choice and number of 
stakeholders has been limited. This would seem to 
reflect the continuation of the traditional science-
policy approach of communicating the results of 
analysis, rather than engaging the widest range 
of stakeholders — and their different types of 
knowledge — more effectively in the prioritisation 
of issues and analysis itself. Stakeholders are 
certainly involved in many futures studies, but 
they are often expert stakeholders rather than lay 
stakeholders with lay knowledge.
Routine publication to the public
A few initiatives have sought to gain wider input: 
for example, in both Poland (for energy policy to 
2030) and Slovenia (for 'Vision Slovenia'), websites 
were used to solicit comments and inputs from the 
general public. The United Kingdom has effective 
dissemination and communication of foresight study 
findings to both stakeholders and the public, which 
has led to effective uptake into some policymaking 
(flooding and obesity studies). Finland, through 
its Committee for the Future, actively consults/
disseminates to regional and public stakeholders 
during the formulation of the government foresight 
study.
Scenario-planning as part of policymaking
A diversity of techniques was observed across 
the countries, including various forms and uses 
of scenarios. Examples of such scenario-planning 
include:
• the Austrian National Environment Plan (1994), 
which introduced the use of scenarios, forecasts 
and projections systematically in environmental 
policymaking in Austria; 
• the UK Future flooding (2004) report; 
• Eururalis in the Netherlands and across Europe 
(since 2003); 
• development scenarios for Slovenia to 2035; 
• France 2025 (future development scenarios).
Thematic or sectoral
Cross-sectoral studies appear to be more common in 
the environmental sphere, even in countries which 
undertake both types. This is hardly surprising 
given the multifaceted nature of environmental 
problems which demand an interdisciplinary 
perspective in looking at long-term futures issues. 
Even those studies that may appear to have a more 
Examples of country studies combining 
quantitative and qualitative long-term 
futures analysis
• Towards a low-carbon Finland 2050 (Finland 
Foresight Report 2009). 
• Tackling obesities: Future choices (UK 
Foresight, 2007).
• Eururalis — the future of Europe's rural areas 
(commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry 
of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, 2003 
and ongoing). 
• POLIS programme on urban environmental 
rehabilitation (Portugal, 2000).
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sectoral basis, such as water, rural environment, 
development or health, are in reality thematic. 
France 2025, for example — a strategic assessment 
of possible future development scenarios for the 
country — addressed issues as diverse as energy 
and climate change, mineral production, agriculture 
and biodiversity.
Horizon-scanning system in place
Only a few countries have formally established 
horizon-scanning systems either centrally or within, 
for example, environmental agencies, e.g. the 
United Kingdom, Netherlands and Portugal. 
The UK's Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre 
was created in 2005 in response to an external 
review of government foresight activities, which 
recommended the establishment of horizon-
scanning capacity. The centre had a rather unclear 
relationship to the main Foresight Programme until 
2009 when it became more clearly identified as an 
integral part the Foresight Programme. Horizon 
scanning, since it relies on non-traditional sources of 
information, such as the Internet, blogs, newspapers, 
etc., may be regarded with some suspicion by 
policymakers and scientists more familiar with the 
use of peer-reviewed publications as the quality 
assurance mechanism for research findings. Horizon 
scanning can, however, provide the necessary 
capacity to identify early-warning signals and 
possible surprises, as well as operationally to 
help identify new technologies coming on to the 
market which may be beneficial for addressing 
environmental problems.
4.3.3 Mechanisms
Formally independent body/degree of independence
The independence of bodies carrying out futures 
work is also an important consideration. Here, 
there can be a trade-off between access and 
independence: for example, some countries, such 
as France, have set up futures bodies at high levels 
of government; this may limit their independence 
and their ability to propose innovative ideas and 
uncomfortable changes. In Sweden, although the 
institution responsible has extensive experience 
with environmental foresight/futures, its agenda is 
defined by the Environmental Quality Objectives. 
The areas it can focus on are therefore relatively 
constrained. In Finland the situation could be said 
to be similar, with the government deciding on the 
agenda for foresight over the term of government. 
However, the agenda changes following each 
government term; departments set their own 
foresight agenda over the four-year period.
In Austria foresight work is carried out within 
government departments, but also in the 
Environment Agency Austria, and with a strong 
history of participation by other organisations/
stakeholders. Similarly in the United Kingdom, 
while central government undertakes major 
set-piece foresight studies, and supports smaller 
studies in government departments, environmental 
agencies such as the Environment Agency and 
Natural England do have a degree of independence 
at arm's length from government and have 
developed their own expertise and perspectives.
In Poland and Slovenia foresight is uncommon, 
and so the institutional capacity is underdeveloped, 
meaning that where studies do occur they usually 
involve organisations external to government, such 
as universities which may have a high degree of 
independence.
Permanent or ad-hoc arrangements
In general, the most effective bodies for futures 
studies have had a permanent role and structure 
within government. Some countries have created 
ad-hoc groups for specific studies: this is the case 
for the Delta Committee in the Netherlands; also 
existing agencies have worked together in different, 
ad-hoc combinations for individual studies. An 
ad-hoc arrangement can be a useful approach for 
a large, set-piece study; however, if futures work 
is not strongly embedded, the use of temporary 
mechanisms can weaken the follow-up to study 
results.
The case studies do not identify a clear advantage 
for informal versus formal networks of futures 
analysts within (and beyond) governments. Rather, 
what appears to be valuable is a network of working 
contacts across different government sectors. This 
can help to break down a 'compartmental' approach 
and also develop more innovative, interdisciplinary 
initiatives.
Formal reporting requirements
Those countries with a formalised obligation 
related to foresight studies are those which 
have incorporated the foresight process into 
policymaking to such an extent that the input is 
a prerequisite for policy/action. For example, in 
Finland a foresight study is used to set strategic 
government direction for the term of government. 
In Sweden, futures studies have been used to set 
the long-term targets for the country, and these 
targets have to be updated. In the Netherlands 
the requirement for futures outlook is provided 
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for in environmental law. In Finland, foresight is a 
cross-thematic requirement, but in Sweden and the 
Netherlands it is an environmental obligation.
4.4 Governance culture and political 
support
4.4.1 Governance culture and tradition of futures 
thinking
From the analysis above on maturity of futures 
arrangements in the countries studied, those 
with the most mature systems tended to have 
either a strong participatory, consensus-building 
governance culture (Finland, Sweden, the 
Netherlands) or a strong external advocacy 
tradition, as well as strong centralised government 
and policymaking (the United Kingdom). A strong 
tradition of academic foresight is shared between 
France and Portugal, but a relatively low level — 
at least until most recently — of embedding this 
thinking in policymaking. Both countries also share 
a strongly centralised governance culture. Countries 
such as Hungary, Poland and Slovenia were 
considered to have nascent futures arrangements 
and all share a post-Soviet history and strong 
scientific traditions, and where a distrust of long-
term planning processes still exists.
A long-standing tradition of futures thinking does 
not in itself facilitate the embedding of futures 
thinking in policymaking. The nature of that 
tradition makes a real difference as to whether it is 
relevant and tailored to policymaking. While France, 
for example, has probably the longest tradition of 
futures thinking through La Prospective — this has 
been largely academically focused and therefore 
not very easily utilised in policymaking. Until very 
recently, futures work in the French government 
looked more at identifying agenda issues rather 
than influencing policy. While agenda setting is a 
key aspect of policymaking, particularly where new 
policy is needed, it does not necessarily support the 
ongoing appraisal of policy options, and especially 
if it is not taking place within or at the demand of 
government itself.
In the United Kingdom the large futures studies 
are very much geared to policy relevance, the 
prioritisation process and resource allocation of 
major foresight studies dependent upon ministerial 
and departmental sponsorship. That does not mean 
that all the major foresight studies in the United 
Kingdom have had a strong degree of influence on 
policymaking. Events can change, as can ministers 
and officials, and the long time scale of up to two 
years for a major study can make it sensitive to 
changing priorities.
Not surprisingly, therefore, for futures thinking to 
be embedded in policymaking the futures thinking 
itself needs to be responsive to policymakers' 
needs — to be 'policy-led' futures thinking if it is 
to support concrete policy formulation. There is, 
however, a real risk in this approach, in that the 
only significant futures work that gets undertaken 
is where there is political will to see it happen. 
A further risk is that futures work will be less 
innovative. These risks may mean that some very 
necessary, but politically uncomfortable, futures 
work might never see the light of day, or be 
obfuscated and potential surprises overlooked. 
However, if the objective is issue raising then 
futures work can come uninvited from outside 
government and potentially could have a 
significant impact if it is picked up by government, 
for example because it chimes with other political 
priorities.
4.4.2 Interdisciplinarity and interdisciplinary 
approaches
The increasing importance of interdisciplinarity 
and interdisciplinary approaches can be observed 
among the many environment-related futures 
studies considered. There is a strong necessity 
for such approaches, and therefore a certain 
inevitability that these will increase in their 
application to futures studies. However, this can 
be hampered by a lack of capacity and expertise, 
for example the relatively low number of social 
scientists (or those with a strong interdisciplinary 
background) in many government departments 
associated with the environment, to provide the 
necessary social perspectives on environmental 
problems alongside the natural scientists and 
economists that are likely to be already well 
integrated into policymaking processes.
4.4.3 Evidence versus strategy
Within broad governance culture within a country 
there may also be different cultural perspectives 
in different ministries or agencies to futures 
work, i.e. the way in which futures work is seen 
as informing their own objectives internally. 
This may reflect also different disciplinary or 
interdisciplinary perspectives of the organisations 
concerned. This issue has already been identified 
in relation to where central government bodies 
are located (and their character) and the extent to 
which parliaments have addressed futures issues 
through formal arrangements.
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It is apparent that in a few countries at least 
futures are used to develop or contribute to the 
evidence base upon which policies are built (and 
often strongly associated therefore with 'science' 
and scientific ministries), but they are also used to 
identify potential strategic priorities and ensure that 
strategies developed have a view to the long term. 
The distinction between evidence and strategy is 
not absolute but, based on the individual country 
reports, it does appear that futures work is generally 
used for two sometimes distinct purposes, and 
that the requirements of each purpose may dictate 
(to a certain extent) the futures methodologies 
employed. In the United Kingdom, for example, 
Natural England uses futures to inform the strategic 
priorities for the organisation, using qualitative 
scenarios developed via an iterative process. In 
contrast, futures work is located in the evidence 
section of Defra (similarly in the Environment 
Agency), and Defra (in its currently ongoing 
national ecosystem assessment) has started to move 
away from the use of qualitative scenarios and 
begun to employ a more quantitative morphological 
approach — extrapolating from existing data to 
create quantitative scenarios of possible futures. 
A similar distinction can be seen in Portugal, and 
such a distinction might be considered to exist 
where futures are located in or close to prime 
ministers' offices, such as in Finland and France 
where futures work is seen as having a role in 
supporting long-term strategy.
Generally it would seem that those countries with 
extensive experience of using futures apply it to 
both evidence and strategy making, and countries 
with less experience usually limit it to one or 
the other application. However, this may reflect 
wider cultural perspectives on the role of science 
in policymaking, for example, or the need for 
quantification for economic valuation (for example 
of ecosystem services). As discussed in Chapter 1, 
futures work can sit uncomfortably in 'evidence' 
as part of evidence-based policymaking. The 
recent UK experience of the move towards a more 
quantitative scenario modelling approach in some 
quarters perhaps reflects a desire for more robust 
'evidence' from futures work. This raises some 
potential risks, however, such as believing that 
quantitative scenario modelling work is actually 
more robust than it can be (given underlying 
assumptions), or that a continued desire for ever-
better evidence is likely to militate against policy 
action. However, a strong use of futures thinking 
would likely employ a range of approaches — 
qualitative, quantitative, combined and other. This 
area would be particularly useful to explore further 
through in-depth research.
4.4.4 Political support and policy needs
A further and possibly more significant element 
that can shape the approach to futures thinking is 
the specific need in the policy sector. This is seen 
most strongly in the Netherlands, where climate 
change and sea-level rise pose strong risks for the 
country. In Poland, ministers perceived the need 
to develop a more coherent long-term policy, and 
they have reformed government bodies to provide 
this, overcoming the rejection of futures work that 
came as a reaction to central planning. In Slovenia, 
another former socialist economy, this long-term 
policy need does not appear to have been seen as 
strongly. Every country is facing strong risks in 
terms of environmental futures, although the degree 
of risk varies (the Netherlands, for example, is 
simply very low lying and at high risk from sea-level 
rise). However, there is also a difference between 
the Netherlands and, for example, Germany in their 
approaches to addressing such future risks. The 
risks that the United Kingdom is facing are not so 
different from those of Germany — but the United 
Kingdom has a strongly developed foresight system 
in place, compared with Germany. These differences 
probably have much more to do with administrative 
culture and their related approaches towards risk 
perception and governance.
Governments can also be influenced by work in 
other countries. In general, the case studies show 
a growth in futures analysis across the countries 
studied. This is probably due to a growing need 
to address long-term policy issues, and possibly 
also to a cross-country diffusion of the idea of 
government futures analysis and of the techniques 
for this. The French parliament, for example, 
looked at the Finnish example when it set up its 
futures arrangements and Hungary looked at 
the UK Foresight Programme in setting up its 
own Technology Foresight Programme. In all 
four countries with nascent futures systems — 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Spain — technology 
foresight work has been prominent. This area of 
futures thinking is advanced in many countries 
and is also strongly supported in the EU through 
the exchange of information and techniques, for 
example via the European Foresight Monitoring 
Network (EFMN). In almost all, the research 
community has strong international links, and these 
have probably speeded the diffusion of technology 
foresight approaches
One important criterion for embedding futures 
work in policymaking is a government policy 
calling for the use of futures studies. This has been 
an important catalyst in Austria (specifically for 
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the environment) and in France and the United 
Kingdom (across policy areas). Germany and 
Sweden, on the other hand, have a different type 
of policy document encouraging futures work: 
a long-term environmental or sustainability 
policy with quantitative targets. Nonetheless, in 
Sweden, the growth of futures thinking across 
government has also appeared to be the result of an 
'organic' process. This has also been the case in the 
Netherlands. In both countries, the policy need has 
been strong; both also have a low 'power distance' 
— i.e. a recognition of relatively equal distribution 
of power between the weak and strong members of 
society, a factor that could encourage exchange and 
learning across government bodies.
Finally, bodies working on forward-looking studies 
can seek to communicate the value of their work and 
to raise awareness, inside and outside government, 
of the need for a futures perspective.
4.4.5 Follow-up
The use of follow-up and feedback to futures studies 
seems to support the successful implementation 
of futures thinking in policymaking. Examples of 
follow-up can be seen in Finland, which includes 
reporting to regional government and citizens; 
in the United Kingdom where follow-up of 
foresight reports is integrated with the sponsoring 
department and a follow-up report after one year, 
often with the relevant staff seconded or employed 
from the futures study to the relevant department; 
and in Sweden where the Environmental Quality 
Objectives that are embedded in all government 
departments require monitoring and reporting 
on progress. At the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) in the United 
Kingdom, for example, follow-up is part of the 
normal policy cycle into which futures thinking has 
now been integrated, and in the Netherlands, the 
Environmental Balances and Outlooks provide input 
for the National Environmental Plan.
In Slovenia and Poland, it is notable that the case 
studies highlighted a reluctance to develop futures 
thinking as a result of the legacy of central planning. 
In Slovenia, consultants from other countries 
have brought in scenario expertise and, while the 
results are positive for individual studies, overall 
futures work has not had a strong follow-up in 
terms of policy in the particular case examined 
('Development scenarios for Slovenia to 2035') 
(although it should be noted that this is only one 
case study, and it is therefore not possible to use it to 
draw clear conclusions more generally).
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5.1 Success factors
What emerge as key success factors in embedding 
futures thinking in government environmental 
policymaking? And what might be the reasons for 
success (or not) in particular circumstances? Success 
in the context of this research has been defined 
by the participants in the high-level interviews 
undertaken in the countries analysed, and by the 
SWOT analyses, rather than by a set of measurable 
criteria (which would have been outside the scope 
of the research). As such, therefore, the success 
factors identified are those that emerge commonly 
or consistently or across more than one country 
(a success factor may come from only one country 
if it is observed consistently across a number of 
examples or projects).
Policy demand and political support would appear 
to be overwhelmingly the most significant factors 
that ensure futures thinking becomes properly 
embedded in environmental policymaking. 
This may be linked to the setting of obligations 
to undertake such futures work, for example in 
legislation or administrative provisions, or through 
the creation of in-house demand and capacity 
to address perceived need, for example in the 
Netherlands where climate change could have a 
major impact on a low-lying country.
The two functions of futures analysis — long-
term thinking/issue raising, and incorporating 
long-term analysis into policy appraisal — present 
a challenge to governments as to how to make 
effective provision for both, and whether this can 
be done effectively under one roof, such as a central 
body, or whether it needs to be more diffuse. There 
would appear to be a multitude of combinations 
that can be successful, from the case studies 
examined. However, there would also appear to 
be an important role for a central body of some 
sort to create the impetus and drive, and wider 
awareness, for particular policy change through 
championing futures/foresight activity, but which 
also has the power to create buy-in by government 
and ministers. This may particularly facilitate the 
issue-raising function of futures work, for example 
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through the big set-piece futures studies, which 
identify the need to underpin major policy change 
(these appear to be important throughout the case 
study countries, including, for example, Foresight 
reports in the United Kingdom and the Delta 
Committee's work in the Netherlands). On the 
other hand, these types of activities risk retaining 
capacity within an expert, specialist function of 
government unless similar capacity also exists 
within government departments and other agencies 
to undertake futures work as part of day-to-day 
policymaking and implementation.
Parliament is clearly able to have a role to play 
in long-term futures analysis, although the 
parliamentary cycle can be a hindrance to long-term 
thinking. The lack of parliamentary involvement 
is not necessarily a barrier to embedding futures 
thinking in policymaking, or conversely necessary 
as a success factor. However, parliamentary 
involvement may be important for facilitating 
democratic engagement in long-term environmental 
policymaking and facilitate a shift of futures work 
beyond a largely expert — and expert stakeholder 
— driven process. Even where extensive stakeholder 
engagement occurs, the tendency is for this to be 
with special interest stakeholder groups and within 
these groups' 'experts' in the field. A formal role 
for parliament in debating long-term issues, such 
as the Committee for the Future in Finland, or the 
delegation in the French Senate, opens the process 
up to democratically elected representatives, and in 
the case of Finland the committee has an important 
role in communicating the government's foresight 
report to the regions, through regional events. In 
Finland this can work effectively because it has 
a small population and is a highly participative 
society. It will be interesting to see how the newly 
established parliamentary role on futures for the 
French Senate works in practice in a much larger 
country with a much more centralised governance 
culture. A formal role for parliament in long-term 
futures challenges directly the traditional scientific/
technocratic approach to policymaking, and indeed 
'evidence-based' policymaking, and requires an 
openness to new forms of 'evidence' about the 
future.
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Policymaking can successfully embed futures 
thinking without parliamentary involvement, for 
example as a requirement within policymaking to 
consider the long term and so create demand for 
futures thinking. But in such circumstances it may 
remain 'in house' unless there is also a requirement 
for extensive participation with external 
stakeholders and the public. Where parliament 
does not have a formal role it may still be able to 
engage in futures issues through its own scrutiny 
function of holding government departments/
ministries to account for their policy actions. This 
is likely to necessitate some capacity building 
among parliamentarians around the importance 
and usefulness of futures thinking, which certainly 
appears to be delivered through a formal role for 
parliament, where members become engaged in 
the process and build capacity in futures thinking 
(as in Finland), but could also be facilitated in the 
absence of such a formal role by an increasing role 
for parliamentary technology assessment offices in 
providing briefing material on major futures issues 
to parliamentarians.
Institutionally, from the countries studied there do 
not appear to be any examples where an external 
body has had a stronger influence on policy, 
compared with internal bodies. Rather, the choice 
seems to be between a body or bodies embedded 
centrally (e.g. France, Poland, the United Kingdom) 
or the diffuse approach of the Netherlands. And 
this appears to be more a question of administrative 
culture, for example paternalistic or participative 
culture; the degree to which 'expert' institutions 
outside government might be more or less 
respected and have influence than government 
departments or agencies; the role of parliamentary 
oversight, if any; and the nature of the issues under 
consideration.
Broad participation is an important factor for 
the success of studies, even those whose work is 
analytical and expert-focused, because this increases 
the opportunity for such studies to be held to 
account and to provide a degree of legitimacy 
where extensive and effective participation occurs. 
This includes ensuring the participation of a 
broad range of government offices. Stakeholder 
engagement is also crucial to establishing familiarity 
and understanding of futures work and building 
networks and capacity. On many environmental 
issues, especially as they often raise issues of 
contention, it is likely to be necessary to engage 
more widely with the public as well as with 
stakeholders, to increase the accountability of 
the process by providing better opportunities for 
the public to participate early and effectively in 
major policy decisions (in line with the Aarhus 
Convention). This becomes particularly important in 
the absence of any formal role for parliament, where 
some democratic accountability can be exercised. In 
addition, good communication (within government 
and externally) of high-quality studies are both 
seen as important factors in providing credibility 
to long-term studies and therefore influence in 
policymaking. The timeliness and relevance of a 
study will also determine whether it is taken up by 
policymakers or effectively ignored.
The success of any forward-looking programme is 
likely to be highly dependent on the appropriate 
skills and capacity of staff to deliver it, and 
particularly the existence of 'champions' 
(or 'ambassadors') who are senior enough in 
government to promote and influence the inclusion 
of futures studies in policymaking. These may 
be champions in individual departments or 
centrally, but they will need to be supported by 
administrative/institutional/governance structures 
to enable and facilitate the influence of futures 
thinking on policymaking. This may be by creating 
the requirement for policy to take a long-term 
view, which in turn can create the demand for 
futures thinking. Structures and measures to enable 
cross-departmental exchange of experience and 
skills are needed, for example through networks or 
a central body to encourage collaborative working 
among agencies/departments; this might include 
agreeing specific memoranda of understanding.
5.2 Barriers to success
A major barrier, alluded to above, is the 
fundamental challenge for futures thinking within 
the science-policy debate and the dominant 
focus of government administration on electoral, 
legislative and budgetary cycles, which 
emphasises short-termism over long-term thinking. 
Policymaking and policy management is dominated 
by the focus on the legislative cycle, and the policy 
cycle traditionally provides a clearer mandate to 
analyse and review past and current developments 
around a policy, rather than to think extensively 
about long-term futures issues. Futures thinking 
is more about a process of looking for signs of 
change and responding by adjusting policies and 
management models, rather than following a more 
traditional linear model of receiving evidence and 
acting on it. There is, therefore, a need for significant 
behaviour change by politicians and scientists, 
and particularly a need for capacity building 
among politicians in order to be sufficiently well 
versed in futures thinking to be able to handle the 
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outcomes from such exercises. One of the important 
consequences of the Parliamentary Committee for 
the Future in Finland, for example, would appear 
to be the fact that senior politicians, including the 
former Prime Minister, have become well versed 
in futures thinking through membership of that 
committee.
Other barriers may be the converse of the success 
factors identified above: the lack of political 
support or policy demand in particular, or poor 
stakeholder engagement and communication, 
for example. However, the lack of parliamentary 
involvement, as has been noted, is not a barrier in 
itself to successful embedding of futures thinking 
in policymaking. The presence of a formal role for 
parliament in futures thinking is unusual among the 
countries studied, but there is extensive evidence of 
futures work being used in policymaking.
Some barriers to futures thinking may reflect 
common problems inherent to public sector 
management. Some civil service cultures face a 
lack of continuity of staff ('institutional memory'), 
as staff are rotated rapidly among departments as 
part of the normal career promotion pathway. One 
consequence of this is that just as someone acquires 
a particular level of expertise they are moved to a 
new position and that expertise effectively is lost 
from that programme. On the other hand, this may 
bring varied perspectives and institutional links to 
other units working on forward-looking analysis. 
Moreover, where civil service cultures lack rotation, 
ministries and offices can develop entrenched 
agendas: forward-looking analysis and innovative 
thinking could threaten such agendas.
Departmental upheaval through changes in 
responsibility and restructuring presents a common 
problem for futures thinking in many Member 
States. Changes in departmental responsibility or 
location of a central futures body can fragment 
futures work or disrupt continuity, which can in 
turn be exacerbated by a high turnover of staff 
(often engendered by constant reorganisation). 
This is far from unique to futures thinking, but 
where futures expertise resides — as it often does 
in less mature systems — in only a few individuals, 
this can create real problems of delivery in terms 
of influencing policymaking. This emphasises 
why capacity building and knowledge brokerage 
of futures thinking and skills across policymakers 
is so important to minimise the reliance on a few 
individuals.
For futures thinking to succeed in influencing policy 
there is a need for policymaking to have sufficient 
responsiveness to issues and events. A highly 
centralised approach involving large studies over a 
long period of time may be unwieldy and make it 
difficult to respond quickly to changing priorities. 
A two-year timescale for a study, for example, 
may mean in practice only a small window of 
opportunity between electoral cycles for large 
studies to be prioritised and delivered. This might 
suggest the need to embed futures thinking more 
effectively at the technical level and then to work 
on the communication of futures thinking to the 
political and public level. On the other hand, the 
Finnish example places the emphasis at the other 
end, on the benefits of building capacity among 
politicians for understanding futures thinking while 
not yet having fully embedded such thinking in 
regular policymaking.
Whereas broad participation on the part of 
government offices and stakeholders is seen as one 
of the keys to success, the case studies underline the 
need to strengthen inter-departmental initiatives in 
government and break down 'compartmentalised' 
cultures. Further steps in this direction are seen as 
necessary even in countries such as the Netherlands, 
which has gone further than others in bringing 
together ministries and agencies to work on joint 
futures initiatives. There is a case for engaging 
policymakers and specialists together in initiatives 
such as guidance, events, policy master classes 
and training programmes. This would encourage 
better policymaking by developing a shared 
understanding of the issues and the role of horizon 
scanning and futures techniques.
Government institutional issues tend to dominate 
the common opportunities and threats identified 
across the countries to effective futures thinking. 
Positive opportunities for futures thinking can be 
seen in the development of strong networks of 
futures thinking across government, counteracting 
the common threat of departmental rivalries. But 
departmental rivalries and poor communication 
across departments of government cannot be 
underestimated as posing particular threats 
to effective embedding of futures thinking in 
policymaking, and these can in turn lead to 
poor levels of political support at the centre 
of government. Frequent reorganisation and 
restructuring of departmental bodies responsible for 
futures thinking can be highly disruptive and erode 
institutional memory and capacity to use futures 
thinking in policymaking.
On the other hand, placing the responsibility for 
futures thinking firmly at the heart of government, 
for example in the prime minister's office or in a 
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large (and politically strong) department, can create 
a significant difference to the opportunities for 
embedding such approaches in future policymaking.
5.3 Final reflections
From the experience observed among the Member 
States studied it would appear that quite different 
cultural approaches can still deliver successful 
futures thinking that influences policymaking. These 
different cultural patterns appear, however, to have 
influenced the evolution of futures work in different 
countries.
In Sweden, for example, futures work is 
decentralised among the many government agencies 
— though participative approaches ensure good 
communication among different government bodies. 
This appears closely consistent with that country's 
non-hierarchical and participative governance 
culture. In France, a more centralised governance 
culture has tended towards a more top-down, 
expert-led approach to futures work. The French 
case in particular suggests that a central body 
— and, more generally, a central call for futures 
analysis — is particularly important in countries 
with a high 'power distance'.
In practice, however, many countries operate a 
combination of approaches. Moreover, governance 
approaches can change. France has recently put a 
much greater emphasis on environment, sustainable 
development and participation (though this change 
was decided at the top).
The frameworks for governance culture highlighted 
several factors mentioned here. The case studies 
bring to light one other possible factor: the 
preference for theoretical versus pragmatic 
approaches in academic and government thinking. 
This might be seen in the comparison between the 
futures tradition in the United Kingdom and in 
France. In the latter, until recently futures studies 
focused on a more academic and theoretical, 
exploratory approach rather than a close link with 
policy.
Overall, both the top-down and the bottom-up 
approaches can deliver futures thinking into 
policymaking. The big set-piece policy change will 
often require big set-piece futures/foresight work 
to underpin it, by providing evidence that makes 
change unavoidable in light of what might happen 
in the future. Even these large set-piece studies still 
need a convergence of other factors to be successful 
in influencing policy; the successful examples have 
succeeded not so much because of the new evidence 
they provided, but the way in which the processes 
brought together and galvanised knowledge on 
the subject, took it into the heart of government 
and made it relevant. Governments with an 
administrative culture of futures thinking may be 
more receptive without the set-piece process. They 
may, for example, be more familiar with the use 
of scenarios as techniques that can bring together 
different types of knowledge and act as platforms for 
knowledge brokerage. Others, however, may need 
overwhelming convergence of evidence, politics and 
economic costs before action becomes the only option. 
This may be an unduly pessimistic or 'catastrophic' 
view of policymaking. It appears, however, in relation 
to futures thinking and environmental policy, to be 
rather common in practice.
However, not all policy can be made through 
high-profile action, and on a day-to-day basis 
there is still a need to build futures thinking 
into policymaking — especially environmental 
policymaking — if such policy is to be properly 
responsive and indeed proactive with respect to 
external driving forces and trends.
Futures thinking, then, may have more or 
less influence depending on how it is used in 
government, for example as 'evidence' or in 
support of 'strategy', which in turn may dictate 
the methodological approaches adopted. Both 
how it is used and the methodology adopted may 
reflect wider cultural attitudes to policymaking 
and may also be influenced by the preferences or 
prejudices of key officials or ministers, for example 
for or against a scientific quantitative approach 
or a participatory qualitative approach. Futures 
thinking can, of course, be used equally for evidence 
building or for strategy development, but the 
policy responses may differ. Futures use in strategy 
development may offer a wider range of plausible 
future options to choose from, whereas a more 
quantitative approach in evidence building may be 
constrained by what can be modelled, rather than by 
the imagination.
This study has made a first effort at taking forward 
the need for empirical studies into the evidence 
for effective embedding of futures thinking in 
policymaking. It has succeeded in identifying a 
range of institutional and governance arrangements 
for achieving influence on policymaking for futures 
thinking. While expanding on the analysis included 
in the BLOSSOM 2.0 project, it remains, however, 
a snapshot sample of 12 Member States — and the 
studies examined — and it is therefore difficult 
to draw lessons that would be widely applicable 
Conclusions
BLOSSOM — A cross-country analysis 65
across all Member States. The reality is that different 
countries have different administrative cultures 
that can help promote or obstruct effective futures 
thinking in environmental policymaking. Two 
drivers for change, however, may gradually erode 
these differences.
• The first is greater EU integration and the greater 
exchange of knowledge and approaches to 
policymaking across the Member States.
• The second is more a set of environmental 
change drivers — climate change obviously being 
to the fore, but other drivers such as biodiversity 
loss, waste and pollution, consumption, etc.
 
The first driver of integration is likely to create a 
greater exchange of knowledge and understanding 
of futures techniques, alongside the development 
of skills and capacities among the Member States. 
The second driver (or set of drivers) creates the 
policy demand recognised in this study as being so 
essential for futures thinking to have real effect in 
influencing policy. Given the current elevated status 
of climate change on the international agenda this, 
in turn, could generate the political support needed 
for futures thinking to become more effectively 
embedded in policymaking. The hope must be, if it 
can happen with climate change, that capacity and 
awareness can eventually filter out into other areas 
of environmental policy. Evidence from some studies 
(e.g. Austria), however, indicates that the current 
economic climate in Europe may be pushing some 
environmental issues, and thus environmental policy, 
down the political (and public) agenda.
On the other hand, long-term EU policy goals that 
recently have been set in areas such as climate 
change and biodiversity protection provide the 
opportunity for a strong role for forward-looking 
analysis. In Germany and Slovenia, for example, 
climate change has been a key area for this type of 
analysis. Thus, the two drivers set out above may in 
coming years become a strong, single driver.
5.3.1 Recommendations for action
However, rather than rely on a trickle-down effect, 
there are active efforts governments can make to 
improve the integration of futures thinking into 
policymaking. These actions should include:
• capacity building — developing and building the 
necessary skills for futures thinking among:
 - policymakers; and
 - politicians;
• knowledge brokerage through networks;
 -  futures 'champions' within government 
departments;
 -  formal networks across government 
departments; and
 -  informal networks across and beyond 
government (e.g. EU networks and sharing of 
information on forward-looking studies);
• coordination of futures work through networks 
across government:
 •  to avoid duplication, but without impinging 
on departmental territory;
 •  to facilitate cross-sectoral (thematic) studies 
where these are needed;
• institutional arrangements that create policy 
demand:
 -  formalised requirements for futures thinking 
in policymaking;
 -  building futures thinking into long-term 
strategy development of organisations/
agencies and government departments;
 -  formalised reporting requirements on 
government;
 -  parliamentary role for futures thinking, 
to help build political capacity and 
accountability;
• techniques for prioritising futures studies:
 -  systematic horizon scanning top-down and 
bottom-up to inform and create awareness 
and shared through networks (not just 
responsive to requests);
 -  stakeholder, public and parliamentary 
engagement in the prioritisation process 
for major studies to create awareness and 
understanding as well as direct input;
• clarity on the distinction between policy-relevant 
futures work and more blue-skies academic 
futures work:
 -  the former responding to policy demand;
 -  the latter pushing the boundaries and 
development of tools, techniques and 
approaches;
• the need for sufficient resources to build capacity, 
networks and institutional arrangements;
• increasing participation, including the broad 
public: new technologies and innovative methods 
could be used to bring in a wider and more 
diverse range of opinions and ideas, as well as to 
disseminate study results and their implications.
 
A further recommendation is that governments 
in Europe and beyond should go further in 
exchanging information on their approaches for 
using futures thinking in policymaking. Some 
networks already exist, for example the European 
Foresight Monitoring Network (EFMN), which 
focuses especially on technology foresight. 
A network on futures thinking in environmental 
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policy could help national governments strengthen 
their work. Such a network could also look at the 
lessons of international initiatives, such as studies 
carried out by the EEA, the European Commission, 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and at ways of 
linking national and international efforts.
One final message arising from the research is that 
the social, cultural and political history and make-up 
of a Member State may have influence on the type 
and role of futures thinking in decision-making and 
policy development and that this in turn may have 
an impact on the type and focus of actions required 
to increase the uptake and use of futures thinking in 
environmental policy development. Understanding 
political and cultural history and developing 
systems and structures accordingly may increase the 
likelihood of successfully encouraging the uptake 
and further use of futures thinking in a particular 
Member State.
5.3.2 Recommendations for further research
There are a number of areas where further research 
would be beneficial.
• Further research in relation to other Member 
States: There have been inevitable limitations 
of this project focusing on 12 countries and a 
wider range of countries would allow a better 
understanding of the degrees of commonality 
and difference among the EU Member States.
 -  This study provides a template for other 
Member States to undertake their own 
similar study of institutional and governance 
arrangements for embedding futures analysis 
in environmental policymaking. The templates 
used for information gathering in the country 
reports (included as appendices to those 
reports) and the case study interview protocol 
attached as Appendix 1 to this report provide 
the basis for undertaking such a study. 
These could then be used to supplement the 
studies from this report, once uploaded to the 
online Knowledge Base for Forward Looking 
Information and Assessment (FLIS) being 
developed by the EEA. 
• Alongside the wider range of countries, there 
is also a need for more in-depth research on 
the institutional and governance arrangements 
in particular Member States and/or taking a 
particular model and exploring it in much more 
depth, at a level of detail that was not possible 
with only a few interviewees per country.
 -  This, for example, might include following 
through specific studies or processes — for 
example centralised large set-piece studies 
and specific policy processes where futures 
have been embedded within a particular 
government department/agency. 
• It would also be useful to look at the next step 
in the chain: while this study has focused on 
institutional and other mechanisms that help 
to embed futures thinking in policymaking, it 
would be useful to look next at the policies that 
have been developed using inputs from futures 
analysis. In what ways, for example, have these 
been different? What barriers remain in terms of 
addressing long-term risks and uncertainties in 
policymaking?
 -  One problem seen in both the Netherlands 
and Sweden is that national governments 
have set ambitious, long-term environmental 
targets, based in part on futures analysis 
— and both countries have recently 
acknowledged that the targets will not be 
met. Falling short of objectives is a potential 
problem across all policy areas. However, it 
would be useful to understand the problems 
that arise in the area of environment, 
especially as the national governments, 
the EU and potentially countries around 
the world are now identifying and setting 
difficult, long-term targets for climate change.
• A further area has emerged from this project as 
a potential area for further research and that is 
the distinction between the use of futures work 
as 'evidence' or for 'strategy'. These may be 
somewhat artificially constructed distinctions 
(reflecting the cultural, political or administrative 
perspectives), but it offers an interesting area 
for more in-depth research into the relative 
effectiveness of futures work when used 
explicitly for one or the other purpose, i.e. as 
'evidence' in policymaking or for testing the 
resilience of organisational strategy in the future.
 
Finally, as this study takes place within the broader 
policy framework of promoting and using futures 
thinking in particular to strengthen environmental 
analysis and environmental protection, future 
research would be most effective if it is carried 
out as part of an informal mechanism for the 
exchange of information among EEA countries and 
possibly also with EU institutions and international 
organisations. Such a mechanism or forum could 
help link research to the analytical needs of officials 
commissioning futures studies, carrying them out or 
using them in policy discussions.
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Key questions/topics to be explored with case study 
interviewees include:
Broad themes to send to interviewees in advance:
1. Your involvement in futures thinking, nature and 
scope of the programme
2. Resources, staffing involved
3. Relationship of futures programme with other 
such programmes
4. Nature of engagement with stakeholders
5. Relationship of programme with policymaking
6. Relative balance between quantitative versus 
qualitative approaches
7. Success factors and barriers to success of futures 
thinking in influencing policymaking 
List of questions [not sent in advance]
Introduction/warm-up
1(a) Introduction to BLOSSOM and purpose of the 
interview
1(b) Interviewee's involvement in or relationship 
to the programme and responsibilities 
Main part of interview
2(a). Resources for the programme/specific study 
and key dates (including reorganisations)
2(b). Who requests/commissions this work with the 
organisation?
2(c). Any legal duty to undertake such futures 
work? 
3(a). Scope of the programme/study, both 
geographical and temporal
3(b). Is the programme/study used to provide a 
strategic basis or to inform specific issues? 
4.  Relationship between this programme (where 
relevant to interviewee) and other programmes 
(e.g. between department/ministry and central or 
other agencies)? 
5(a). Nature and extent of engagement with 
stakeholders
5(b). Internal/external members for example on 
working groups?
5(c). Consultation mechanisms internally/
externally?
5(d). Communication mechanisms internally/
externally? 
6.  What is the relationship between foresight 
institutional/organisational structures and 
the policymaking institutional/organisational 
structures (within an agency if appropriate, 
and outside, e.g. with government, or across 
government departments)? 
7(a). What is the relative balance in the programme 
between qualitative versus quantitative 
approaches/studies — extent to which this 
affects the influence on policy?
7(b)  Is futures thinking used as a technical tool 
('technocratic') and more internally, or more 
as a participative tool and perhaps external 
facing? 
8.  What is the nature of the sectoral/policy 
community concerned (i.e. are there sector-
specific characteristics that lend themselves 
to futures thinking or effective use of such 
approaches)? 
Conclusion/reflection
9. Reflecting on futures thinking in [Member State] 
generally and the programme/organisation 
specifically, please give your assessment of 
how the arrangements work: what works, what 
doesn't work, etc. What were any success factors 
you can identify (and measures of success; how 
to know if it is successful?) and/or any barriers to 
success in your experience?
Appendix 1 
— Case study country interview protocol
BLOSSOM — A cross-country analysis70
Appendix 2
Appendix 2 
— BLOSSOM poster presented at IAIA'10 
in Geneva, Switzerland, April 2010
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